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Abstract 
Recently, there is a rapid development of Internet and Distributed Artificial Intelligent 
(DAI) technology. One of the major subject amid these technological development is 
intelligent agent. Researchers are now devising various types of autonomous and 
intelligent agents such that human user can delegates them to a wide range of tasks. 
One of these tasks is to shop on the Internet. 
With the establishment of e-marketplace and agent transaction protocol (e.g. 
contract net protocol, auction etc.), agent can sell or purchase product on behalf of his 
user. Before an agent can make a deal, it has to gone through five major stages: 1) 
Need Identification, 2) Product Brokering, 3) Merchant Brokering, 4) Negotiation, 5) 
Purchase and Delivery. In order to increase the favorableness of a deal, intelligent 
algorithms are incorporated in the agent at each stage of the process. This opens up 
many research problems in the field of Agent-mediated E-Commerce. 
In our work, we will devise an One-to-One negotiation model of buyer agent 
and seller agent. The two agents are free to bargain with each other in an electronic 
marketplace. Based on Game Theory (GT), we will model the incomplete information 
bargaining (an I-Game) into a game with complete information {C-Ganie) and try to 
solve for the sequential equilibrium of the game. We will conclude that our agents 
should used the strategy prescribed by the Sequential Equilibrium (i.e. equilibrium 
strategy). The agent will get a less favorable payoff if he deviates from his 
equilibrium strategy while his opponent keeps using his equilibrium strategy. We will 
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Recently, agent technology becomes a very hot topic in the field of distributed 
artificial intelligent (DAI) [30] and Internet application. All around the world, 
researchers are devising various autonomous agents. When these agents receive the 
command of their users, they can decide and act independently to fulfill their duties 
on behalf of their owners. An important application of agent is to utilize them for 
selling or purchasing product on the Internet. In an electronic market place [24], the 
buyer's agent and the seller's agent can bargain freely on a product. 
In this thesis, we will study a particular scenario of bargaining between the 
seller agent and the buyer agent. The bargaining/negotiation is basically using a 
double auction protocol and will consist of one seller agent and one buyer agent 
bargaining on a particular product. 
After we have briefly explained the game setting and notation of the 
bargaining, we will introduce a very important concept called Sequential Equilibrium 
to solve for the bargaining game. The Sequential Equilibrium will specify the 
equilibrium strategy of the players. If one of the players deviates from his equilibrium 
strategy while his opponent keeps using his equilibrium strategy, his payoff will 
decrease. Now, we will proceed to provide a brief account of the double auction 
protocol adopted in our game setting. 
1.1 Double Auction 
Double auction is very common protocol adopted by the bargaining setting 
between the seller agent and the buyer agent. There are many varieties in this type of 
protocol. In the first type, buyer agents (buyers) are allowed to propose their prices. 
The seller agents (sellers) can either reject or accept the proposal of the seller. 
However, the seller is restricted to make any counter proposal. If he is not interested 




In the second case, the buyer agent may announce a contract on products or 
services that he wants to acquire. When a seller agent is interested in providing 
relevant products or services, he will reply the buyer with a bid. The bid should 
specify various attributes of products/services including the corresponding offer price. 
If the buyer agent regards the bid as unfavorable and replies with a negative 
acknowledgement, the seller agent may try to propose another offer. In most cases, 
this offer should be more favorable than the previous one i.e. the seller makes some 
concession to the buyer. If the seller does not want to make any concession, he may 
decide to stop the negotiation at that stage. 
In the third case, both seller agents and buyer agents can make proposals to 
their opponents. A deal can be concluded if both sides regard a particular proposal as 
favorable. However, formulating an optimal strategy may not be an easy task. Many 
algorithms use a trial and error approach. On every single round of the negotiation, 
participants will adjust the attribute(s) of the proposal and make it more favorable for 
the opponents. The negotiation will complete if the buyer's and seller's proposal 
"converge". When the proposals of participants cannot converge after a prolonged 
period of adjustments, conflict deals may arise. Then, players do not have any gain in 
the negotiation process. 
1.1.1 One-to-One Negotiation Model 
However, even if we restrict our attention to bargaining models to the double 
auction, the problem's scope is still very large. We have already stated that there are 
three broad cases of two sided double auction. Apart from possible action spaces of 
participants, the bargaining may be One-to-One, One-to-Many or Many-to-Many. 
One-to-One means that there are one seller's agent (seller) and one buyer's agent 
(buyer) bargaining with each other. One-to-Many means that there are a single seller 
and multiple buyers or a single buyer and multiple sellers. Finally, Many-to-Many 
means that there are multiple sellers and buyers bargaining with one another. Even 
after we have resolved and clarified the number of participants, we have to specify the 
maximum number of rounds that the negotiation can proceed to. This number may 
bear some implications on the outcome of the game because discount factors are 
usually present in negotiation and, the longer the negotiation proceeds, the less 
favorable the outcome will be. Furthermore, the E-marketplace may also have the 
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problems of incomplete or asymmetric information. Each participant may know some 
private information of his opponents in a different extent. For some bargaining 
models, the participants may also have the problem of imperfect information (i.e. they 
cannot remember their previous move). 
We cannot study all the above types because they have great disparities in 
their structures. Some types are relatively easy to be solved for optimal strategies 
while others may be extremely hard to be done so. As a result, we would like to 
narrow our scope down to a One-to-One Negotiation Model. The term "Negotiation" 
implies that the transaction may not end in a single round. The One-to-One property 
resembles our every day experience of shopping in a store or B2C website. When 
multiple buyers or sellers are not bargaining simultaneously, their negotiation may be 
regarded as One-to-One. During the process of bargaining, the buyer may be thought 
of engaging in a sequence of One-to-One Negotiation. Because One-to-One 
Negotiation forms the basis of many complicated bargaining, we decide to study this 
kind of model. 
Moreover, the rules of One-to-One negotiation model are as follow. The buyer 
agent will first search the web and find prospective seller agent to negotiate with. If 
the seller also considers that he wants to bargain with the buyer agent, he will propose 
an offer price of the seller. While the seller agent can propose offer price of the 
product to the buyer agent, the latter has two possible responses only. He can choose 
either to accept or reject the offer price proposed. If the seller and buyer agent cannot 
make a deal in the current round, the bargaining may continue to the next round with 
the seller agent proposing another offer to the buyer agent. The bargaining will 
continue until the buyer agent accepts the offer of the seller agent or the total number 
of negotiation round reaches a pre-specified number. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3’ we 
will further elaborate the exact rules and notations of the double auction that will be 
used in our negotiation model. 
1.2 Sequential Equilibrium of the One-to-One negotiation model 
After we have specified the nature and rules of the bargaining game, we will 
try to apply Game Theory (GT) and find the equilibrium of the game.In GT's terms, 
One-to-One Negotiation Model belongs to Dynamic Games with Incomplete 
Information [13]. The game is dynamic because it has a multiple number of rounds. 
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At the same time, the game is with incomplete information as the player may not 
know the private valuation of his opponent. 
When we are given a particular Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information, 
we may try to find the Sequential Equilibrium [4] of the game. The Sequential 
Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game with Incomplete information is very similar to the 
Nash Equilibrium of a Static Game with Complete Information. As the Nash 
Equilibrium concept is more well-known and easier to be comprehended, we will first 
illustrate the concept of Nash Equilibrium and draw analogy to the Sequential 
Equilibrium. In a Static Game with complete information, i.e. a game with single 
round, known payoff and players' valuation, the Nash equilibrium will specify a 
equilibrium point of the game. The equilibrium point will prescribe a combination of 
players' actions. If a particular player is deviating from the action prescribed by the 
Nash Equilibrium while other players keep player their equilibrium actions, he will 
get a less favorable payoff. Therefore, nobody has the incentive to deviate from the 
equilibrium point of the game and should act according to the actions prescribed by 
the Nash Equilibrium concept. 
The concept of Sequential Equilibrium is very similar to that of Nash 
Equilibrium but it applies to Dynamic games with incomplete information. The 
Sequential Equilibrium should specify courses of actions to be played by each player. 
No player will have the incentive to deviate from the course of actions as this may 
result in less favorable result of the bargaining. 
In Chapter 2, we will elucidate in details the Sequential Equilibrium and 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium [5] in Dynamic game with incomplete information. We 
will clarify the necessary assumptions and the game rules of our One to One 
Negotiation Model. The Game Tree of the model will be described and relevant 
concepts for solving the optimal strategies in the game will be given. In Chapter 3, we 
will use a One-to-One two stage negotiation as an example for illustrating methods 
for finding Sequential Equilibrium. 
1.3 Result 
In the example we illustrated in Chapter 3, we have derived a set of well defined 
course of actions that should be used by the seller agent and the buyer agent. Some of 
these results and possible course of actions are rather enlightening. Under most 
circumstances, players may consider that, in a multi-rounds negotiation process, one 
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should "utilize" each round of the negotiation and propose meaningful bids. However, 
in our result, we can show that player intentionally abandon some round of the 
negotiation by proposing an offer which he think that his opponent will not accept in 
the current round. Moreover, the result further confirm intuitive notion that raising the 
price or making the offer less favorable than the previous round's should not be the 
course of action prescribed by the Sequential Equilibrium. We will illustrate the 
derivation of these results in Chapter 3 and make the conclusion in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Modeling the One-to-One Negotiation 
In this chapter, we will try to model our One-to-One Negotiation Model in a Dynamic 
Game with incomplete information (I-Game). When we study the nature of the One-
to-One Negotiation Process, we will find that it resembles an I-Game. After modeling 
the negotiation process as an I-Game, we will try to explain the concept o^ sequential 
equilibrium. The sequential equilibrium in this negotiation process will prescribe a 
course of actions to be used by players (i.e. both buyer agent and seller agent) such 
that when a player deviate from these actions, his payoff will be less. After a thorough 
elaboration and good understanding on this concept, we will select a relatively simple 
One-to-One two stage negotiation model and illustrate how the solution concept of 
sequential equilibrium can help finding the course of actions of buyer agent and seller 
agent in Chapter 3. 
2.1 Nature of One-to-One Negotiation 
The incentive for us to model the One-to-One Negotiation game as a Dynamic game 
with incomplete information [13] is very obvious. In a One to One Negotiation Model, 
there are one seller agent and one buyer agent bargaining on a particular product. 
Before the negotiation process is initiated, the seller or buyer agent may search for 
potential opponent to bargain with. This critical step in agent mediated e-commerce is 
usually called the Product Brokering procedure [22]. As identities of trading partners 
are usually anonymous, players may not have information on the private valuation of 
their opponents. (Private valuation refers to the worthiness that a particular player put 
on a product.) Since players do not know the valuation of other, they are in conditions 
of incomplete information. Moreover, our negotiation process may not end in a single 
round. Therefore, the bargaining process is a Dynamic Game (i.e. a multi-stage game). 
Since our negotiation process is a Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information, 
well established methodologie may be used for finding the equilibrium point of this 
bargaining game. However, before we proceed to review those methods, we will state 
some basic assumptions for our One to One Negotiation Model such that the theory of 
Dynamic Game with Incomplete information is applicable. 
2-2 Basic Assumptions in the One-to-One Negotiation Model 
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In order to understand the One-to-One Negotiation process and apply the Model of 
Dynamic Game with incomplete information, we have to make some assumptions on 
properties of participants and their bargaining processes. While some of these are 
general assumptions in Game Theory, others may be specifically for our One-to-One 
negotiation model. There are altogether three major assumptions in our one-to-one 
negotiation model and we will enumerate them one by one in the following sections. 
2.2.1. Rationality assumption 
Assumption 1: The participants in the game are always rational. 
The rationality assumption is very important and every Game Theory should 
have this assumption. When the rationality assumption does not hold, almost all 
properties in the game theory will cease to exist. Therefore, it is very important for us 
to have this rationality assumption before we can apply the theory of dynamic game 
with incomplete information to solve our One-to-One negotiation model. 
In real life situation, "rational" behaviors may not occur frequently. Many 
participants are simply "irrational", especially when there are chaos or market 
malfunction. However, our meaning of rational is a little different with that in the 
dictionary or etymology. Seller's agent (seller) and buyer's agent (buyer) are rational 
as long as they satisfy the following requirements. Firstly, they should have Perfect 
Recall [11]. Perfect Recall means that each player can remember his previous actions 
or bids. Players should have this ability in a One-to-One Negotiation game. During 
the negotiation, the agent should be able to "store" and "save" their proposals and 
counter proposals. If the Perfect Recall assumption holds, there will be a "shortcut" in 
formulating the solution of the game. The "shortcut" will be stated explicitly in future 
contexts. 
Apart from perfect recall, we also assume that the player will try to maximize 
his expected payoff in each round of the negotiation given that he assume his 
opponent will use his equilibrium strategy. When our player needs to maximize his 
payoff in the bargaining given that his opponent is using an equilibrium strategy, he 
will adopt the expected payoff criteria [12], [7], [4], For each combination of 
strategies of players, the expected payoff function will give the corresponding payoff 
for each player. If the opponent is using his equilibrium strategy and the player 
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acquires a greater expected payoff by using action A rather than action B, action A is 
"better" than action B. This particular argument may be clearer when we write down 
the concrete payoff functions in future sections and illustrate the exact payoff value. 
In our game setting, we assume that players or players' agents have the ability to 
formulate expected payoff functions and decide the Sequential Equilibrium point and 
their course of actions accordingly. Two elements are required for computing this 
expected payoff function. Firstly, we need to know all possible outcomes of the 
strategy and realization probabilities of outcomes. An outcome in our model may be a 
conflict deal or an offer proposed by the seller's agent that is agreed upon by buyer's 
agent. Secondly, we need to know utilities of these outcomes. We will define utility in 
later section of Chapter 2. When computer agents are incorporated with suitable 
utility function, they can calculate the expected payoff of each combination of 
strategies and find the sequential equilibrium of the game. Together with the 
assumption of Perfect Recall, our agents will be rational. 
2.2.2 Private valuation assumption 
The second assumption in our negotiation model has been mentioned briefly in 
section 2.1 and they are reinstated as follow. 
Assumption 2: In our negotiation model, participants have their own private 
valuation on the product. While each player should know his own private valuation, 
he may not know the private valuation of others. 
This assumption can be explained naturally by our everyday experiences. In [15], 
the authors have stated two factors for player's uncertainty on the exact valuation of 
other. These two factors are called preference uncertainty and quality uncertainty. For 
example, when we want to buy an antique from a particular shop, we have a personal 
preference on the antique. The seller should also have a personal preference on the 
product. Moreover, players may have some special information on the intrinsic 
quality of the product. (The antique is a masterpiece or just a copy.) Therefore, the 
seller or the buyer may not know the exact private valuation of his opponents. They 
can simply guess the "baseline" of other and propose their deal accordingly. 
One reminder is needed at this point. In order to simplify our model and 
calculation, we exclude any possible correlations between players' private valuations. 
I* 
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If reader are interested in the correlation or revision effect of private valuation, one 
may refer to [15] for a possible reference. 
2.2.3. Subjective Belief on opponent，s private valuation 
Because a player does not know the exact private valuation of his opponent, he can 
simply guess this quantity. Therefore, we have the following assumption. 
Assumption 3: Although players do not know the exact private valuation of their 
opponent, they should bear some subjective belief on this private valuation i.e. they 
will consider that the opponent's valuation is following some probability distribution 
over a range of possible value. 
Among the three assumptions that we have mentioned in Section 2.2, 
Assumption 3 is the least trivial. First of all, what is the exact meaning of "subjective 
belief,? Furthermore, how is this "subjective belief formulated? While we will leave 
the formulation of subjective belief in later section, we attempt to answer the first 
question. Subjective belief is a conditional probability distribution on opponent's 
valuation [6], [8], [13], When a player participates in the bargaining, he may make 
some reasonable guess on the "type" of his opponent. If he regards a particular 
product to be valuable, he usually conjectures others to have similar sentiment. 
Therefore, the player's conjecture on other's valuation is based on his own private 
valuation. In mathematical terms, the conjecture is a probabilistic estimation 
conditioned on the valuation of oneself. 
In later sections, we will explain the random vector model and utilize standard 
methods for formulating subjective belief of player. When the agent can formulate the 
exact value of belief, they can plan their actions accordingly. However, before we try 
to model subjective belief, we will further elaborate on the rule of our negotiation 
game. 
2.3 The Rules of the One-to-One Negotiation Model 
Our One-to-One Negotiation Model is assumed to proceed in the following way. 
When a buyer wants to acquire a product, he may utilize his agent to search on the 
web. There are many techniques for an agent to search his potential opponent to 
bargain with. For example, the buyer's agent may request the content (html, xml, etc) 
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on the web and analyze items on sale. The buyer's agent may also use KQML or other 
types of messages for issuing a contract on the items [2], [19]. In some E-
marketplaces, the host may standardize the type of product in a particular market. 
Potential sellers and buyers who are negotiating on a particular type of product will be 
guided to join the same market. If more than one seller's site or seller's agent can 
offer the product, the buyer will select his vendor. Of course, he may bargain with 
multiple vendors "simultaneously". 
In our One-to-One Negotiation Model, buyer agents are supposed to search the 
web and find potential sellers. After it has participated in the prospective market, the 
buyer agent will request the item from the seller agent(s). In our bargaining model, the 
buyer agent will announce the product that he wants to buy. When the seller agent(s) 
receives the request and wants to bargain with the buyer agent, he will provide an 
offer. Because we will study negotiation on a single attribute only, we require this 
attribute to be the offer price of the product. Other attributes of the product will be 
specified in product brokering and product selection stages. Since contract net 
protocol is used, those attributes are specified in the buyer's or seller's contract. The 
initial buyer's contract may specify the maximum number of negotiation rounds. 
Because different agent ontology [21] may be used in constructing the contract, we 
will skip the detail of the contract here. 
The buyer agent receives and evaluates the bid(s) of the seller agent(s). In our 
game setting, the buyer agent cannot make any counter offer to the seller. If the offer 
price is favorable, the buyer agent will accept the bid. However, if the offer price is 
unfavorable, the buyer agent will reject it and send a negative acknowledgement to 
the seller agent. Although the buyer agent may quit the negotiation, we need not 
consider this option. Quitting the game will never be an optimal action for the buyer 
agent. (If the buyer agent quits the game, he will face the risk of losing a more 
favorable offer. However, by rejecting an offer from the seller, he need not bear the 
same risk.) 
Depending on the reply of the buyer agent, the seller agent will plan his future 
actions. If the buyer agent has accepted the first offer of the seller agent, the 
negotiation process will finished. The seller needs to provide the product (with 
attributes specified in his or the buyer's contract) at the proposed price while the 
buyer needs to pay the product. However, if a negative acknowledgement is received, 
the seller agent will choose one of the following two options. Firstly, he may quit the 
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negotiation or retain his first offer. When he chooses this option, the game will be 
terminated and the players end up in getting a failed negotiation. The seller agent may 
insist on the first offer and see if the buyer agent will make any concession. Secondly, 
he may evaluate and provide a more favorable offer for the buyer agent. The buyer 
agent, on receiving this second offer, decides whether to accept or reject this offer. 
Then, similar processes as the first round negotiation will happen recursively and the 
total number of rounds may go to two, tree, four and so on. 
The above negotiation will end in one of the following possible ways: 
i. The seller agent terminates the negotiation. 
ii. The number of rounds of the negotiation has reached a pre-specified number. 
iii. The buyer accepts a particular offer of the seller. 
When the negotiation terminates, the players will acquire their corresponding 
payoff. In the next section, we will discuss the nature of these payoffs. 
2.4. Payoff of players in a One-to-One Negotiation Model 
Before we mention the payoff that a player can get when the negotiation terminates, 
we need to define utility functions of players. As we have mentioned in Assumption 3, 
the seller agent (seller) and the buyer agent (buyer) has private valuation on the 
product. We will denote the seller's private valuation as Cs and the buyer's valuation 
ascB. Without considering the risk prone or risk adverse properties [32], we adopt 
linear utility functions for the participants of the game. (Remark: When the players are 
risk prone or risk adverse, their utility function may be convex or concave 
respectively.) Suppose there is an offer a” at the n th round of the negotiation. If this 
offer is accepted by the buyer, the non-discounted utility Us for the seller is the 
monetary value of Cs less the amount of an, i.e. m = an — Cs. On the .other hand, the 
non-discounted utility wsfor the buyer is the monetary amount of a” less the amount 
ofcs, i.e. HB = CB-AN. One reminder is needed at this point. We use "non-discounted" 
to describe the utilities of the seller and the buyer that we are now discussing. Because 
our negotiation process will proceed in multiple rounds, the utility for forming the 
same deal in different round may be different. In general, players want to form a deal 




After we have defined the utility function of the players, we can calculate their 
payoff in all three cases. In case i and case ii of section 2.3, a failed negotiation will 
result. A failed negotiation means that the seller and the buyer cannot make any 
agreement or transaction. Because the seller retains the product and the buyer keeps 
his "money", payoffs for them are zero. In case iii, the buyer accepts an offer from 
the seller. Suppose the seller and the buyer have made an agreement at the n th round 
of the negotiation. Because the deal isa«, the non-discounted payoff for the seller and 
buyer will be AN - CS and CB - AN respectively. Clearly, these payoffs are calculated 
from their corresponding utility functions. 
Now, we must note the sign of the payoff carefully. When a conflict deal occurs 
in a negotiation, payoffs for both players are zero. By terminating the negotiation or 
rejecting all the offers, the seller and buyer can always ensure a failed negotiation in 
the bargaining. Because players in the game are rational (assumption 1), their payoffs 
in the negotiation process must be non-negative i.e. a； - Cs > 0 and cb - a/ > 0. From 
the non-negativity of payoffs, actualized offers in a One-to-One Negotiation process 
must lie within the range of seller's valuation and buyer's valuation. In the following 
sections, we will revisit this property and see its influence on the seller's action space. 
2.5 Possible Action Space of the players in a One-to-One Negotiation Model 
From the description in previous paragraphs, we know that the seller agent (seller) 
and the buyer agent (buyer) should have different set of possible actions during the 
negotiation process. We will first define the possible action space of the seller. 
2.5.1 Possible action space of the seller's agent 
Except in the first round of the negotiation, there are two possible types of actions that 
the seller agent (seller) can choose during each round of the negotiation. The seller 
can either provide an offer for the buyer agent (buyer)or quitting the negotiation. We 
will use the symbol Q to denote the action of quitting the negotiation. With the same 
notation as in the previous sections, we will use the notation an for a seller's offer at 
the n th round of the negotiation. 
Now, we want to specify the possible range for an. As we have mentioned 
previously, the private valuation of the buyer iscs. By assumption 3, we argue that 
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the seller should have a subjective probability on the possible range of value of c^. If 
the buyer's valuation CB is within an open interval (/, /?), the action of the seller agent 
will somehow depend on the values of I and h . Clearly, the seller has no incentive to 
provide an offer with value greater/?. If the seller's offer is greater than or equal toh, 
the value of this offer must be greater than CB . The buyer agent will get a negative 
payoff should he accept this seller's offer. Therefore, the buyer agent will never 
accept an offer which is greater than/? and h should be an upper bound for a", Vw. 
While the upper bound for an should be h , the lower bound should be max{/, Cs}. 
We will divide our argument into two separate cases. Ifc^ > / , the value of max{/, c^} 
is equal toCs. Because a seller will not propose any offer which is less than his private 
valuation Cs (we have mentioned this in section 2.4), a , should be greater than or equal 
t0Ci = max{/, a} . On the other hand, we supposec^ < / such thatmax{/, Cs] = I. If the 
seller proposes an offer which is equal to / , he can ensure that the buyer agent will 
accept the offer. His payoff will then be given by I-Cs which is greater than 0. If the 
seller agent uses an offer an such that Cs <an < l , he can also ensure that the buyer 
will accept the offer. However, his gain will be less than l-cs , Therefore, it is 
suboptimal for him to choose an offer which is less than / = max {I, c^}. 
Some digressions are needed for clarifying a special case of the problem. When 
the value of h is less thane!，the buyer agent is unwilling to purchase the product at a 
price which is higher than or equal to the seller reserved price. In such case, no 
negotiation can happen and a failed negotiation will always occur. When a negotiation 
does occur, h > Cs and the possible values of an will be on the close 
interval[max{/,c,},/7],V«. 
In conclusion, the possible actions of the seller agent in the r^ round of the 
negotiation, a\, should lie within [max{/, Cs}, h]. In later round of the negotiation, the 
seller agent can p r o p o s e , w > 1, in the range [max{/, Cs}, h] or choose the action Q. 
If we denote the possible action space of the seller agent as SN for the n th round of 
the negotiation, =[max{/,c.},/?]and^n = [max{/,Cs},/7]uO, for n > \ . 
2.5.1 Possible action space of the buyer agent 
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Now, we want to talk about the possible action space of the buyer agent. Compared 
with that of the seller agent, the action space of the buyer agent is relatively simple 
and consists of two actions only. The first one is to accept the offer, which we denoted 
as^ z^ . The second one is to reject the offer, which we denoted as 没.If we use En to 
denote buyer's possible action apace in the nth round of the negotiation. En = {0, , 
Vn. 
2.6 Random Vector Model for the One to One Negotiation Model 
In previous sections, we have already discussed the utility function and possible 
action space of the players. Two important parameters, CS and CB , occur in the utility 
function of the bargaining process. In section 2.2, we incorporated two important 
assumptions in our One-to-One Negotiation Model. Firstly, the seller agent and the 
buyer agent know the exact value of CS and CB respectively. Secondly, each player 
may know opponent's private valuation or bears a subjective belief on the valuation. 
Now, we will present the sequential expectation model which arises from the 
subjective belief of the players. 
2.6.1 The problems of sequential expectation model 
At the beginning stage of the negotiation, Cs, the seller agent (seller) will evaluate the 
possible value of cs based on the private valuation of the seller. Its estimation may be 
represented by a conditional probability distribution function,凡(CB | c^). For example, 
if the seller's private valuation on the product is少，the seller agent will regard the 
probability that the buyer's private valuation is jc a s R S ( C B = x | Cs = 3;). On condition 
that the valuation of players has no correlation with each other, we may replace 
Rs�cb I Cs) dL^Rs{cB). Similar to the case of the seller, we denote the buyer's subjective 
belief | CB) . The physical meaning of RB{CS | CB) is equal to that of RS(CB | CS) 
but the role of seller is changed to the role of buyer. 
Although the seller and buyer agent can form their subjective belief 
independently, these kinds of belief formulation will pose great difficulties over the 
evaluation of optimal strategies. These problems are first discussed in [6] and it is 
called the problem of sequential expectation. Suppose now the seller agent has 
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formed a subjective probability RS{CB \ Cs) on the buyer's private valuation C^ . This 
estimation is called the ^tW^f s first-order expectation on buyer's valuation or utility 
function. Then, he will use this first-order expectation to formulate his equilibrium 
strategy in the negotiation process. However, his equilibrium strategies will also be 
depended on buyer's estimation on the seller's private valuation. If players' valuation 
has a positive correlation and the buyer believes that private valuation is low, the 
buyer will probably have a low valuation on the product. The seller agent may need to 
provide a relatively low offer. Because this low offer is derived form the first-order 
expectation of the buyer agent on seller's valuation, the seller agent must formulate 
the expectation on the buyer agent's first-order expectation when he needs to find his 
equilibrium strategy. This expectation of the seller may be called the second-order 
expectation because it is established on the foundation of the first-order expectation. 
Moreover, the seller's second-order expectation targets on Csrather thanes . From the 
buyer agent's perspectives, he faces similar dilemma and needs to formulate the 
second-order expectation ones . The seller agent will then need to form another layer 
of expectation on buyer agent's second-order expectation - and so on ad infinitum. 
This model is called the sequential expectation model. 
Undoubtedly, there are great complexities in formulating the sequential 
expectation model. We need some tricks for eliminating this type of nuisances. In the 
following section, we will introduce another type of model for handling the 
incomplete information in the bargaining process. 
2.6.2 Random Vector Model of the One-to-One Negotiation Game 
To overcome the sequential expectation problem, we need to establish a common 
probability distribution function, R * ( c �C B ) , which determines the "type" of players. 
In [6], the author has stated the condition that R * {CS, CB) can be formulated and they 
will be presented briefly in the next sub-section. 
After we assume the existence of R * (c ,^ CB) , we introduce a player called 
"Nature" and denote it as Player 0. At the beginning of the game. Player 0 will make 
two random draws to determine the "type" of the players. If we use our One-to-One 
Negotiation Model as an example. Player 0 will draw the private valuation of the 
buyer and seller. According to the probability, R * (c.), Player 0 will "draw" the 
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seller's valuation, Cs, and notifies this result to the seller agent (seller). The buyer 
agent (buyer) will not know the result of this random draw as he should not realize the 
private valuation of the seller. Suppose now the value of Cs is or. After Player 0 has 
notified the seller that Cs = a , he will make a second draw on the buyer's valuation, 
according to the probabilityR*{cB\cs = a). The result will be sent to the buyer agent 
(buyer). The seller agent will not know the result of this random draw as he should 
not realize the private valuation of the buyer. After Player 0 has completed the two 
random draws, the players will start the One-to-One Negotiation. Because there are 
random draws on c^and CB (which are single element vectors) at the beginning of the 
negotiation processes, the restructured game is called a random vector model {or prior 
lottery model) 
The purpose of remodeling our One-to-One Negotiation by a random vector 
model may not be obvious. Clearly, Player 0 will draw the parameters of the 
participants according to the probability distribution ftinction R * {CB, CS) . If 
= and | cb) = * (c. | cb) , subjective belief of players will 
not be changed. Moreover, each player will remain “ignorant” on his opponent's 
private valuation. What we have changed is not the nature but the underlying structure 
of the negotiation model. Originally, the incomplete information is modeled as 
uncertainty on opponents' valuation. The resulting structure is a typified Dynamic 
Game with Incomplete Information (I-Game). After we have incorporated Player 0 
and his chance moves in the bargaining process, the game will be transferred from a 
Game with Incomplete Information (I-Game) to a Game with Complete but Imperfect 
Information {C-Game). Players of the game are simply unaware on some moves of 
Player 0. 
After we have changed the game structure from Incomplete Information to 
Imperfect Information, we can exploit more standardized methods for solving the 
One-to-One Bargaining Model. These methods include the concept of information set 
and sequential equilibrium. However, before we explain in detail these concepts, we 
need to revisit the nature o f * CB). 
2.6.3 Existence of Objective Belief in Random Vector Model 
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Before our negotiation model can be restructured by a random vector model, we have 
to ensure the existence of objective belief and we have the method for 
formulating this probability distribution function. In [6], the writer introduces some 
criteria and restrictions for the objective b e l i e f ( c . , cs)to exist. When R\cs, CB) can 
satisfy these criteria, the I-Game can be converted as a Bayes’ Equivalent C-Game. 
(In Bayes' Equivalent games, same strategies will result in same payoffs for all 
players.) In order to formulate the Bayes' Equivalent C-Game, R*, RS and RB must 
satisfy the following two relationships: 
= and |cb) = *(c.|cb) ...(1) 
where 
/ ” ( c * ) = , ( c " ， c s ) and 
E^{cB,Cs)dcB R*(CB,Cs)dcs 
JCB ^ ''CS 
Because of the relations in (1) and (2), we can write 
R * (CB, CS) = RS(CB 丨 R * {CB, Cs)DCB = RB(CS I R * (CB, cs)dcs …(3) 
Even if we have the above relationship on * , RS and RB , it is still very 
difficult to find the functional form of R* . Suppose now a buyer wants to purchase a 
product in an E-Marketplace. Clearly, he knows his exact valuation on the product. 
After he or his buyer agent has announced a contract on the product, a potential seller 
or seller agent may try to approach him. The buyer agent realized that he and the 
seller agent does not know the private valuation of each other. Moreover, he does not 
know exactly the first-order expectation of the seller on his private valuation. If he 
tries to estimate on the first-order expectation of the seller, he will fall in the trap of 
the sequential expectation problem. 
What he can do is to study the mean, variance and autocorrelation of CB and CS. 
Then, he should use those data to formulate the probability distribution 
function R * (CB, C.) . If the seller and the buyer agent can estimate similar market 
datum and both of them are using the standard techniques of statistical inference, 
their * {CB, CS) should be very similar. Once the player has obtained the functional 
form of R*(CB,CS�, he can formulate and R*(cs\CB) .This kind of 
estimation will ensure the restructured C-Game to be Bayesian Equivalent with the 
original I-Game. However, it should be reminded that R * (CB, CS) is very hard to find 
and we will not concern ourselves in the methodologies of e'stimating R * (CB, CS) • In 
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later sections, we suppose that R*(CB,CS) has already been given and the 
corresponding subjective probabilities satisfy the conditions stated in (1). We will 
apply the random vector model directly for solving the solutions of One-to-One 
Negotiation process. 
By converting the original 1-Game into a corresponding C-Game, the difficulties 
in finding equilibrium (Sequential Equilibrium)4 can be reduced. What we need to 
tackle is a Game with Complete but Imperfect Information. In any Imperfect 
Information Game, there is an important concept which is called Information Set 
which can help us to organize the imperfect information of the game. We will now 
introduce this important concept. 
2.7 Information Set in a One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
As we mentioned in the previous section, Player 0 will select the valuation of players 
at the beginning of the bargaining process. He will take two actions at the beginning 
of the negotiation game: a random draw on the seller's private valuation Cs and 
another random draw on buyer's private valuationcs • While the seller agent (seller) 
knows the outcome of the first random draw, he does not know the result of the 
second. On the other hand, the buyer agent (buyer) knows the outcome of the second 
draw but not the first one. After Player 0 has finished his duty, he will leave the 
bargaining process. The seller agent and buyer agent will then negotiate with each 
other and all subsequent actions will be remembered by them. 
For example, a seller and a buyer are bargaining in a N-rounds negotiation. 
Suppose the zth (/ < Aground of the negotiation have just been finished and the seller 
is about to propose his (/ +1) st offer for the buyer. (Of course, we assume that the 
seller and buyer agent have not taken any action to finish the negotiation in the 
previous / rounds.) As before, we denote the first i actions of the seller agent as an, 
f o r l < « < / and there should not be a case such thata” = 0 in the first i rounds of the 
negotiation. On the other hand, we will denote the actions of the buyer agent in the 
first i round of the negotiation as bn fori < w< / . Similarly, there should not be a case 
such that bn = (l>. When the seller agent has to propose the (/ +1) st offer, he will know 
his own private valuation, the value of an for l<n<i and the value of hn for 
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\ < n < i . However, he does not know the exact private valuation of the buyer agent 
CB as he does not know the outcome of one of the chance move of Player 0. 
Because each of the players does not know one of the chance moves o^Player 0, 
we need some techniques to represent this inperfect information. The technique that 
we used is called the information set [11], Before we give a detailed explanation on 
information set, we need to mention the concept of game tree for our One-to-One 
Negotiation Model. 
2.7.1 Game Tree of the One-to-One Negotiation Model 
If we shift our focus on the game tree of the negotiation process, we know that the 
game tree is composed of many nodes and arcs. Nodes and arcs in the game tree 
represent players' decision epochs and players' actions respectively. The game tree 
starts at a node which is called the vertex and we denote it asO. If we model our One-
to-One Negotiation process by the random vector model, the vertex O will be a 
decision node of Player 0, At the vertex O, Player 0 will draw randomly on the 
private valuation of seller. This action is represented by an arc that is originated from 
the vertex and terminated at the second decision node of Player 0. The appearance of 
the game tree after Player 0 has drawn the valuation of the seller is presented in 
Figure 2.1. 
O Player 0 
A 
The isharacteristic of seller is / \ 
drawn according to the / • \ 
probability R*(C8). / 肌 a \ 
• 4 • Player 0 
Cs min 、丨 Cs max 
Figure 2.1. Game tree at the first step of the garne. 
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In Figure 2.1, we see that arcs are branching out from the vertex O. The probability 
that a particular arc will be selected by Player 0 is governed by the probability 
distribution After Player 0 has chosen a particular arc (e.g. arc A in figure 
2.1), the game tree will proceed to the next stage and terminate at a node, say Cs . The 
node c/ is a Player O's node and it specifies the private valuation of the seller. At this 
node, Player 0 will select one of the arcs that are originated from Cs . These arcs 
represent the possible private valuation of the buyer that Player 0 can draw from. The 
dynamic of the game tree at this stage is presented in figure 2.2. 
O Player 0 
/ f \ 
The characteristic of setter is / \ 
drawn according to the / arc a \ 
probability R*(C$)- / \ 
/ T ^ 
• Jk • Player 0 
The charactertetic of buyer Is / \ 
drawn according to the / “ c B \ 
probability / \ 
. . . . . . … . . : . 
Information set of seller S g I I ^ T 
Figure 2.2. Game tree at the second step of the game. 
Some notes must be made on Figure 2.2 in order to eliminate any 
misinterpretation and clarify the meaning of the game tree. Firstly, the symbol “ ” 
can be seen at the second stage of the game tree. The symbol specifies that there are 
many nodes-arcs-nodes drawing similar to that at the center of the second stage of the 
game tree. Secondly, we can see a short description with the wording "Information set 
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of seller" at the bottom of the node-arcs-nodes drawing and a dashed line is used to 
connect all the seller's nodes at the third stage of the game. A brief explanation can be 
made on the meaning of Information Set. From node Cs ’ Player 0 will draw the 
private valuation of the buyer. After Player 0 has made the decision, a particular arc 
(e.g. arc B in Figure 2.2) will originate from node Cs and terminate at a seller's 
decision nodexi. However, the seller does not know he is at a node because he 
does not know the decision of Player 0 on buyer's private valuation. He only knows 
that he is within one of the nodes that are connected by the dashed line as shown in 
Figure 2.2. The nodes that are connected by this particular dashed line are said to be 
belong to the same Information Set. Therefore, the Information Set characterizes the 
imperfect information of the seller agent (seller) on the action of Player 0. (For the 
detail explanation and specification of Information Set, please refer to section 2.7.2) 
Suppose now, the action branch come to a particular seller decision nodes 
called XI . The seller agent does not know he is situated at this decision node x\ . 
However, he realizes that he is in a particular Information Set that contains the 
nodexi. When the seller agent is situating at this Information Set, he will determine 
and actualize his action. In the wording of Game Tree, one of all action branches 
originating from x\ will be chosen. (The seller does not know his action branch is 
originating fromx\ .) This action branch will terminate at the buyer's decision node 
called少 1. The dynamic at the game tree can be represented by Figure 2.3. 
Similar to the seller agent, the buyer agent does not know that he is at the 
decision node 少i. He only realizes that he is in the one of the nodes connected by the 
dashed line as shown in Figure 2.3. The situation can be explained easily by the game 
tree as shown in Figure 2.3. Firstly, Player 0 will draw on the characteristic of seller 
(as shown by the blue arc.) Because the buyer agent does not know the exact blue arc 
that are drawn by Player 0, he will think that one of the red arcs, which specifies the 
same buyer's valuation, is selected by Player 0. The seller agent will then choose his 
first offer. This first offer is represented by the green arcs in Figure 2.3. As a result, 
the buyer agent cannot distinguish those nodes at which the green arcs terminate. 
These nodes will form an Information Set of the buyer agent. When the buyer agent 
is at the information Set that contains the decision node y\, he will determine and 
actualize his optimal action. An arc will come out from y\ and terminate at seller 
decision nodes such that the negotiation proceeds to the second round. Unless the 
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action branch comes to a terminal node, the game will continue and form a series of 
connected nodes and arcs. By the game tree, we can trace the subsequent game under 
any combination of players' actions. 
Before we proceed to discuss the nature and properties of Information Set, we 
would like to pinpoint some terminologies that are used to describe the Game Tree of 
our One-to-One Negotiation Model. In Figure 2.3, we say that 少lis a (immediate) 
successor ofxi • (Decision node B will be the successor of decision node ^ if there is 
an action branch originates from A and terminates ini?.) Apart from nodes and arcs, 
rank is another important concept in game tree [11]. Rank relates to the concept of 
nodes and each decision nodes has a particular rank number. The rank of a decision 
node is the total number of arcs when we count from the vertex O to the decision node. 
• o Player 0 
/ f t r \ 
i her \ Player 0 
Cs min / (/ Cs max 
7 
^ I ^ . 
： Direction: 
/ ； / ； / : 
/ Value of Cs drawn r ： ： -
r i f t Seller ^ Value of C B drawn 
/ / :: 
/ Action of seller 
/ 妒 
/ / 
.. ' ； 
• •  .. .. 
... ‘ ; 
• ； • 
/ / •  / 
— r T r Buyer 
y^ Information set of 
Figure 2.3. Game tree at the third step of the game. 
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In our game setting, the arcs include the two chance moves of the Player 0 and the 
corresponding actions of players that cause the decision node to be reached. 
A particular sequence of nodes and arcs that originates from O and terminates at 
a particular (decision/terminal) node is called a path or unicursal path [5], [11]. A 
unicursal path starts from the vertex O, follows the chance moves of Player 0, and 
subsequent decision nodes and arcs if any. As a result, it determines uniquely which 
decision node is reached. Each decision nodes can be characterized by a unicursal 
path leading to it. Hence, the decision node can be parameterized in the 
form X{cs, CB, An -1), B{t - d) . (Af-i)and B(t-i) represent the history of actions taken 
by the seller's agent and buyer's agent respectively) With the concept of tmicursal 
path, we can now explain what an information set is. 
2.7.2 Information Set in One-to-One Negotiation Model 
From previous section, we see that a unicursal path in our One-to-One negotiation 
process contains two chance moves of Player 0. As each participant does not realize 
the outcome in one of the chance moves of Player 0, he has imperfect information on 
the unicursal path. Because the node reached in a game is uniquely determined by 
the unicursal path, the participant does not know his exact position in the game tree. 
However, as the player knows the rank of the game, one chance move of Player 0，all 
action branches of the seller agent i.e.<^«and all action branches of the buyer agent 
i.e. bn, he is not in complete ignorant of his situation. If some unicursal paths have the 
same rank, draw onc^, an and bn but different draw ones, the seller can group these 
unicursal paths together. As the seller agent does not know the draw of Player 0 on 
the buyer's private valuation, the seller agent cannot distinguish between the elements 
in the group of unicursal paths. Similar to the seller agent, the buyer agent can group 
his nodes by the nature of unicursal paths. In the buyer's case, the chance move that 
the buyer agent knows is different from that of the seller. 
In Game Theoretical Approach, we represent the group of nodes {unicursal 
paths) by an Information Set. Information Set is very important in game theory. It 
specifies a particular set of decision nodes that a particular player cannot distinguish 
with one another. When we are dealing with the One-to-One Negotiation Model, the 
parameters that the players cannot distinguish are the outcomes of the chance move 
played by Player 0. In all nodes of a particular information set, possible actions that 
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can be played by the player are the same. The player knows that he is in a particular 
information set and makes a choice of actions in the possible action space. 
In order to clarify the concept, we will elaborate the nature and properties of 
information set in two separate cases: the seller's case and the buyer's case. 
2.7.2.1 Seller's Information Set in the One-to-One Negotiation Model 
As described in the rule and assumption of our One-to-One Negotiation Model, the 
seller agent does not know the exact valuation of the buyer. When the bargaining 
game is restructured by the random vector model, we regard that the seller agent does 
not realize the selection of Player 0 on the buyer's private valuation. Therefore, the 
seller agent does not know his imicursal path (node) in the negotiation process. 
However, he can guess his unicursal paths and group them together. The imicursal 
paths in the group should have same rank, same draw by Player 0 on seller's 
valuation and same history of the negotiation. The group contains a set of nodes that 
the seller cannot distinguished at a particular instant of the game. We call the group 
of nodes as the seller's Information Set. 
As a result, an Information Set of the seller agent can be specified by the 
following parameters. 
i. The rank of the unicursal paths, denoted as It , for the nodes in the 
Information Set. Because there are two chance moves at the beginning of the 
( 2 / - 2 ) 
game, each player has proposed {t — 1)actions. ... ~ - ~ = t-\ . Therefore, 
V 2 y 
the total number of negotiation rounds that have been finished should be given 
by / — 1. The last action on the unicursal paths is played by the buyer's agent. 
He may accept i.e.凌 or reject i.e. ^the (/ - \)st offer of the seller's agent. 
ii. The seller's private valuationCs. The value of Cs is determined by the first 
action of Player 0. 
iii. The sequence of actions taken by the seller agent, i.e. an fori < t j < t - \ . The 
seller agent provided these offers in the previous t - 1 rounds of the negotiation. 
Clearly, there should not be any Q (termination action) in a” ； or otherwise, 
this particular information set (with rank It) cannot be reached. 
iv. The sequence of actions played by the buyer agent, i.e. ^nforl < w < / - l . The 
buyer agent will disclose his actions during the bargaining process. Similar to 
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the case of seller agent, there should not be any 伞(agreement) in bn for 
\<n<t-2. Otherwise, this particular information set (with rank It) cannot 
be reached. 
Because a particular information set of the seller agent contains those 
parameters as shown in i to iv, we can denote its general form 
as L{2t, Cs, axai.. m - d, bibi.. ha - d) . The notation c. inside the general form implies 
that the Information set is belonging to the seller agent. Therefore, the subscript “广 
in Is is redundant. Because the actions a\a2...a{t-\) or b\hi..b{t-\) implies that 
(/ - 1 ) rounds of the negotiation have been completed, we may also eliminate the rank, 
“ I t i n the notation of L . Moreover, we want to define the history of actions as 
A{t -1) and Bn - d such that An - d = ami...an - d and B{t - d = b\b2...b(t - d . After these 
modifications, we can simplify the notation of seller agent's information set 
dLSl{Cs, Ait-]),Bit-\)). 
When we refer to the possible action spaces of the buyer agent, we realize that 
seller's Information Setl{cs, A{t-\),B{t-\)) can take two possible form depending on 
the buyer's action at the (/ — 1) st round of the negotiation. In the {t -1) st round of the 
negotiation, the buyer agent may accept or reject the {t - 1 ) st offer of the seller agent. 
Therefore, the corresponding forms of seller agent's Information Set are 
/(c., and/{cs, Ai t -x^Ba- i^ ) . As h \ , b 2 , … … b e 9 or 
^ otherwise the negotiation will terminate before the t-\st round, we may further 
simplify the notation of the information set as I(Cs, Aa -1)) or I(cs, A(t -1), . Clearly, 
/(c., A(t-i)) occurs when the buyer agent has rejected the (/ - 1 ) st offer and the 
negotiation will continue to the t th round. I{cs, Ait -1)，(p) occurs when the buyer 
agent has accepted the {t -1) st offer of the seller agent. All nodes belong to this 
Information set will be terminal nodes and the players will share their payoff 
according to the agreement of the negotiation. 
Finally, we will mention the nodes that are contained in the information 
set [(cs, AitBat-\)). Because the seller agent has all the necessary information 
(seller's valuation and the history of the game) except on the selection of Player 0 on 
the buyer's valaution, decision nodes within the se t / ( c�� ( f - i ) ’B( f - i ) ) are difference 
from each other only on the value ofcB . Therefore, for specific Cs, A(t - d and B(t - d , 
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I{cs, A{t-\\B{t-\)) will contain all the decision nodes in the form of 
X{cs, CB = cr, A{t -1), Bit - d) , for / < o- < /?. 
2.7.2.2 Buyer's Information Set in the One to One Negotiation Model 
After we have mentioned the nature and properties of seller agent's information set, 
we will shift our attention to that of the buyer agent. The structure of buyer's 
information set has two major differences with that of the seller agent. Firstly, while 
the seller agent knows the draw on c.but notes, the buyer agent has the opposite 
knowledge that he knows CB but note. . Therefore, the information contained in a 
buyer agent's information set should be difference from that of the seller agent. 
Secondly, the buyer agent is "one step lag behind" the seller agent. For an arbitrary 
buyer agent's information set, the number of buyer agent's actions in the history of 
actions should be less than that of the seller agent by one. Indeed, the rank of a 
unicursalpath to a buyer's node should be in the form of(2? +1) whereHs a positive 
integer. By the similar notation as stated above, an information set of the buyer agent 
should have the following parameters. 
i. The rank of the unicursal path to any decision nodes in the information set of 
the buyer agent, which we denote as(2/ + l). Because there are two chance 
moves at the beginning of the negotiation, the seller and buyer agent has taken 
t and 1-\actions respectively. (•/ 2 + / + / - l = 2/ + l). The total number of 
rounds of negotiation that have been finished is given by 卜 1. The last action 
of the negotiation is played by the seller agent and he may have proposed his 
t 论 offer or terminated the negotiation. 
ii. The buyer's private valuation cs. This is one of the outcomes of the chance 
moves played by Player 0. 
iii. The sequence of actions of the buyer agent in the previous {/ - 1 ) rounds of the 
negotiation, i.e. bnforl <n<t - \. The buyer agent made these replies to the 
offers of the seller agent in previous ( / - I ) rounds of the negotiation. Clearly, 
there should not be any 凌 in bn or otherwise the nodes in the information set 
cannot be reached. 
iv. The sequence of actions of the seller agent in the previous 1 rounds of the 
negotiation, i.e. an ^or \ < n < t. Because the seller agent will disclose his offer 
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during the bargaining process, the buyer agent knows the exact value of the 
offers. Similar to the case of seller, there should not be any O 'm the actional, 
fori < « < / - ! . Otherwise, the nodes in the buyer's Information set cannot be 
reached. 
From the parameters as shown in i to iv, we can denote the buyer's Information 
set as lB{cB,2t + \,axa2…..at, hbi……b(t-i)) .With similar reasons of the seller's 
Information set, we can simplify the buyer's Information set by simply using the 
notation/(cs, At, B(t -1)). 
While there are two possible types of seller's Information set in our One-to-One 
Negotiation Model, buyer's Information sets can also be categorized into two major 
types. Similar to the case of the seller, the type of a buyer's Information set depends 
on whether the seller agent chose to continue or terminate the negotiation at the/ th 
round. Because b\,h2, , and hu - D must take the value 6, the two types of 
Information Set of the buyer can be represented by /(CB, A{T - \)Q) and I(CB, At). Once 
again, a buyer's Information set, I(CB, At, Bit - d) , should contain decision nodes in 
the form X(cs = a, CB, At, Bu -1))，Va e Cs, where C. is the set of all possible seller's 
valuation. 
Although the worthiness of introducing the concept of Information set may not 
be clear at this point, we will illustrate the relationship of Information set with the 
solution concept of our One-to-One Negotiation Model in later sections. Before 
illustrating the relationship, we need to find the probability that a player is in a 
particular decision node given that he is in a particular Information set. This 
probability is called the player's belief in an Information set. Since a imiciirsal path 
uniquely determines the decision node that a player is situating at, the realization 
probability of the unicursal path is also the realization probability of the 
corresponding decision node. In Game Theoretical terminology, the realization 
probability of a unicursal path is the chance that the players will follow the particular 
unicursal path in the game tree. The realization probability should be governed by the 
probabilities of chance moves played by Player 0 and the probabilities that the seller 
agent and the buyer agent will choose the particular course of actions (or choose the 
arcs) as specified by the unicursal path. We have already learnt the probability 
distribution of the chance moves of Player 0 (i.e. R * {cs, CB) ). However, we have not 
mentioned the probability that the seller/buyer will choose a particular course of 
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actions from the possible action space when the game proceeds. Before we can 
calculate the realization probability of a unicursal path and, subsequently, the player's 
belief in an Information Set, we must leam the methodologies for formulating the 
probabilities that a player will choose a particular course of action. In the next section, 
we will try to model the player's probability on choosing his actions by the concept of 
behavior strategies. 
2.8 Strategies of the players in a One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
In every Information set of the game tree, an (seller or buyer) agent must choose an 
action among the possible action space of the Information set. In Game Theory, a 
combination on the choices of actions specified for each Information set of a player is 
called the "strategy" of the player. (Note: In many other references, strategy will be 
defined as player's optimal actions depending on opponent current or previous actions. 
However, the term strategy mentioned in this and subsequent sections must be 
comprehended from the angle of Game Theory and they may have quit different 
meaning to the term strategy referred to by other references. We will illustrate below 
the definition of Pure Strategy, Mixed Strategy and Behavior Strategy in Game 
Theory.) Although a player can choose his own "strategy", he can hardly know his 
opponent's strategy until his opponent plays out the choices of actions during the 
negotiation. However, the player should be able to make some guessing on the 
strategy of his opponent. Furthermore, if the player can find the equilibrium point (i.e. 
Sequential Equilibrium), he should know the course of actions used by his opponent. 
In this section, we introduce a concept called Behavior Strategies. When a player can 
find the equilibrium point of the bargaining game, he can regard his opponent as using 
the behavior strategy which can achieve the equilibrium point. 
As we have mentioned in section 2.2, players have Perfect Recall on all their 
previous actions used in the negotiation. A game with Perfect Recall is relatively easy 
to solve because we can rely on Behavior Strategies for achieving the equilibrium of 
the game [4], [5], [11]. However, before we explain the concept of Behavior 
Strategies, we want to discuss two major types of strategies: pure strategies and mixed 
strategies. Based on pure and mixed strategies, we will elaborate the nature and 
properties of Behavior Strategy. 
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2.8.1 Pure Strategies in the One-to-One Negotiation Model 
In our One-to-One Negotiation Process, there are three players in the game: the seller 
agent (seller), the buyer agent (buyer) and Player 0. Player 0 can be regarded as a 
"virtual" player while the seller and buyer are "real" players. At an Information set of 
a "real" player, he has to make a choice on the actions in his possible action space, 
(Decision nodes in the same Information set should have the same possible action 
space.) As the possible action spaces of the seller (i.e. = [inax{/,c]’/7] and 
Sn = [max{l,Cs},h]uQ, where n is a positive integer) are continuous, there should be 
an infinite number of Information sets in our negotiation model. We cannot define a 
finite set of pure strategies as [12] or similar literatures did. However, we can adopt a 
modified definition on the pure strategy of a player in our negotiation model. We will 
first define the pure strategy of the seller agent. As we have mentioned in section 
2.7.2.1, the seller's information sets that contain decision nodes but not terminal 
nodes has the form/(c!，水卜 i)). Clearly, the possible action space of the seller agent 
at I(cs,A{t-\)) should be given hy St • If we denote the set of all possible Information 
setI{cs,A{t-\)) by A, the pure strategy of the seller agent can be defined as follow. 
For V I{cs,A{t-\)) € Is , the pure strategy of the seller agent is given by the 
function 瓜:I{cs,A{t -1)) — St. From the definition of ;^ , the pure strategy of the seller 
agent can be interpreted as a plan of seller agent's actions in the negotiation process. 
When the seller agent reaches a particular stage of the negotiation (as specified by the 
information set), he can look up the plan and see what action he should take. We 
should note that we are simply concerning the definition of pure strategy and not 
bothering how the player can derive this pure strategy or plan of actions. In 
subsequent section, we will know that, when the equilibrium point (Sequential 
Equilibrium) of the game can be found, the pure/behavior strategy and hence the plan 
of actions can be revealed. 
Similarly, we can defined the pure strategy of a buyer agent by a function, TUB . 
The buyer's Information sets that contain non-terminal nodes are given by the general 
form/(cB,^t) . Clearly, the possible action space of the buyer agent at I{cB,At) 
should be given by & . If we denote the set of all possible Information set 
I{cB,At) by I b，w e can define the buyer agent's pure strategy as follow. 
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For V l{cB,At) G h , the pure strategy of the buyer agent is given by the 
function 油 : I{cB,At) Et. 
When we inspect the function m and 油，we know that the action of a player at a 
particular stage of the negotiation depends on the information set the player is 
situating in. Because an Information set contains information on the history of the 
game, the strategy as specified above is non-Markovian. If a player is using a pure 
strategy in the negotiation process, he will determine his optimal actions by 
considering the whole history and evolution of the game in the previous rounds. 
2.8.1.1 Payoff Function 
Given the value of Cs andcs, the pure strategies of the seller agent and that of the 
buyer agent can uniquely determine the unicursal path, the terminal node and the 
corresponding payoff (utility) of players. In Game Theory, these utilities are usually 
expressed by a two-dimensional vector function H{cs, cb, m,7m). The payoff function 
II(CS, CB, ； c o n s i s t s of two components, Hs and HB , which denotes the payoff for 
the seller and that of the buyer respectively. 
When a player knows the pure strategy used by his opponent, the player can use 
his payoff function to determine the optimality of a particular pure strategy. We will 
illustrate this point from the seller's perspective. Suppose the buyer's agent is using a 
pure strategy and the seller's private valuation is equal ioa . For any pair of pure 
strategies, and 瓜” , o f the seller, is more favorable than m" 
if Hs(cs = a, CB, > Ns(cs = a, CB, m"). A pure strategy, will be optimal if 
Hsifs = A, CB, M ) > HS{CS = a, CB, M, M ) , MITS and M. One may easily observe that 
an optimal pure strategy m' may or may not exist in the negotiation game. 
Similarly, when the seller's pure strategy, m' in the one-to-one negotiation is 
known, the buyer's agent can determine the optimality of his strategy. Suppose we 
denote the pure strategy of the seller as m and the buyer private valuation as^ z^ . A 
pure strategy, M', will be optimal if HB(CS, CB - M, > HB{CS, CB = TB, M ) , 
and 7m. 
2.8.2 Mixed Strategies in a One-to-One Negotiation Model " 
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If a player knows (or can make a reasonable guess on) the pure strategy of his 
opponent in our One-to-One negotiation model, he can determine his best reaction by 
the payoff function. Under most circumstances, a player will not know the "exact" 
pure strategy used by his opponents. However, if we can use game theory to find the 
Sequential Equilibrium of this One-to-One bargaining game, the equilibrium point 
will specify the course of actions or the probability of a particular course of actions 
that will be used by the players. The player can then estimate the probability that his 
opponent will use a particular strategy by solving the equilibrium of the game. 
As we say that the equilibrium may specify the probability of a particular couse 
of actions that will be used by the players, a player may regard his opponent's 
strategies as a probability distribution of possible Pure Strategies. This probability 
distribution is represented by the concept of Mixed Strategies in Game Theory. We 
will use the case of the seller agent (seller) to illustrate the concept. 
With the notations used in 2.8.1, we denote a pure strategy of the buyer agent by 
the function m such that;zs : I{cB,At) -> Ef, V/(cs, A) e /s . We let l i s be the set of all 
possible pure strategies of the buyer agent such that for all possible ；z&, m&XlB. Then, 
a Mixed Strategy of the buyer can be defined by a function qs such that qB7m — [0,1] 
and 工 qBim) = 1. If the seller regards the buyer as using the Mixed Strategies qs, he 
thinks that the buyer will play a particular pure strategy ；z&' with a probability . 
= 0implies that the buyer will not use the pure strategy ； . As a result, the 
payoff function of the seller should be modified to • 
Hs(cs = a, CB, m, qs) = ^ qB{7w)HS{CS = a, CB, TB, ；Z&) • 
几BGD五 
Clearly, Hs{cs = a, CB, M, QS) is a weighted average of payoff functions with pure 
strategies as argument. The payoff function of the buyer can be derived similarly if 
the buyer agent realizes the mixed strategy used by the seller by evaluating the 
equilibrium point of the bargaining game. 
Although Mixed Strategies can represent player's uncertainty on his opponent's 
strategies, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to utilize them in our One-to-One 
Negotiation model. As we can see in the above paragraph, the Mixed Strategy {qs or 
cjs) is a function with the Pure Strategies as parameter. Thrs domain is a set of 
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functions which are specify by the Pure Strategies of the seller and the buyer. 
Moreover, the structure of these Pure Strategies is very complicated. For example, the 
action space of the seller consists of offers within the range [max{/, c.}, h]. As the 
range [max{/, Cs], h]is continuous, there will be an infinite number of actions within 
this range and, as a result, there will be an "infinite" combination on the choice of a/， 
\<i<N, and an infinite number of information set. We can hardly write down all 
possible Pure Strategies i.e. n^andFIs . Because we do not know the exact domain 
of Mixed Strategies, they are very hard to be used. The buyer agent and seller agent 
can hardly manipulate Mixed Strategy and try their combinations (one for the buyer 
and one for the seller) to evaluate the equilibrium point. Therefore, we must try other 
methods for solving this loophole such that our agents can model the uncertainty on 
his opponent strategy. Our alternative is to use Behavior Strategies in game theory 
and we will discuss this concept in the following section. 
2.8.3 Behavior Strategies 
Although each player can hardly utilize the Mixed Strategies for understanding 
opponent's behavior, the reference in [11] defined a type of strategy called the 
Behavior Strategies which can overcome this problem. Indeed, Behavior Strategy is a 
subset oiMixed Strategy. The author proofed that by using Behavior Strategy alone, 
we can evaluate the sequential equilibrium of a dynamic game with perfect recall. 
Because the One-to-One Bargaining Process is an extensive game with Perfect Recall, 
the above rules also apply to our model. Therefore, when a particular player.considers 
a combination of seller's and buyer's strategies for playing the sequential equilibrium 
(i.e. agreement) in the bargaining game, he need not consider Mixed Strategies. He 
just needs to search those Behavior Strategies of his opponent (and of his own) to 
evaluate this sequential equilibrium, and those Behavior Strategies have well-defined 
structures. When we want to derive the equilibrium or suitable strategies to be used by 
an agent in the next chapter, we will bare these important guidelines in mind. 
We now mention the properties and structure of Behavior Strategies. The 
Behavior Strategy of a player specifies the probability that a particular action in the 
action space will be used when a player is in a particular Information Set. Clearly, the 
sum of probabilities for all actions in the action space of a particular Information Set 
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should be one. In notation, we can represent a Behavior Strategies of the seller agent 
(seller) by 5 [ ； A n -1)) = a] = , where 0 < /? < 1 and [； (^cs. An -�))二 = 1, Vcs ’ 
A{t -1) and a^St. Similarly, we can represent a Behavior Strategies for the buyer 
agent (buyer) by q , where 0 < c/ < 1 and [ 办 [ ； 二 a,] = 1 , 
Mcb , At and a'G Er. (Note: the Behavior Strategies of player specify the probability 
that the player will use a particular action in the player's action space when he is in a 
particular Information Set. A probability distribution function will represent the 
Behavior Strategies in each Information Set. Therefore, the s and b as stated above 
should be different in each Information Set. To simplify the notation, we use to same 
notation s and b throughout but reader should be reminded that they are different at 
each Information Set.) Because the possible action space of the buyer agent at any 
Information Set has two elements only (either accepting or rejecting the previous offer 
of the seller agent), the corresponding Behavior Strategy specifies probabilities that 
the buyer agent will accept an offer at all Information Sets. More precisely, a 
Behavior Strategy is in the form [^；r(cB, At) - 6\ and b\7r{CB,At) = \/CB and At • 
Clearly 
h[;r(cB, At) + b\7r{cB, At)-(l}\-\. 
Suppose now, the game has proceed to the tth round and the seller agent has 
just proposed at as the latest offer. When the seller agent think that the buyer agent 
has a private valuation CB and uses a Behavior Strategy b, he conjectures that the 
buyer agent will accept the offer, at, with a probability given by b[7r(cB, At)=小、.The 
reasonable estiamte of buyer on seller possible actions can also be represented 
similarly by the seller's Behavior Strategies. 
2.9 Realization Probabilities in a One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
After we have described the three major types of strategies in the game, we will 
define the realization probability of a particular unicursal path by using the Pure 
Strategies of a player and the Behcnior Strategies of his opponent. By evaluating the 
realization probability of the unicursal path of a terminal node, we can obtain the 
expected payoff of the players. The expected payoff can help us to evaluate the 
Sequential Equilibrium (optimal agreement) of the game. 
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A unicursal path of the game tree can end up in two different types of nodes. 
One of them is the node of the seller's agent (seller) while the other is the node of the 
buyer's agent. Now, we will first discuss the node of the seller's agent. Because a 
decision node of the seller must lie within the information setl{cs. An - d) , this node 
can be represented by the notation CB, 乂(f - d) . (Clearly, there should not be any 
Q in A{t -1)and any (/>\n the history ofS“-i) . ) Similarly, the terminal node of the 
seller can be represented by the notation X(cs, CB, A(T -1)勿• A decision node and 
terminal node of the buyer can be represented by X(cs, CB. At) and X(cs, CB, A(t -1)2) 
respectively. 
From the notation of nodes, we can easily learn their predecessor-successor 
relationship. Decision nodes of a seller should be followed by nodes of the buyer and 
vice versa. Given a seller's decision node, = or, cs 二 <t, 乂/ -1)，its successor 
should be those nodes given by the notation X(cs = a, CB = a, At - \at) where a/is an 
action within the possible action space of the seller agent at the t th round of 
negotiation. When the seller agent has not played a " the buyer agent may not know 
exactly which of his particular node will be reached. However, if the buyer can figure 
out the private valuation and the (optimal) Behavior Strategy of the seller, he can 
calculate the realization probabilities of X{cs = a,CB = cr. At - \at) given that the game 
has reached X(cs 二 or, cs = cr, At-\) . This realization probability should be given 
by s[7r{cs = or, A{t -1)) = at\ . 
2.9.1 Realization Probabilities for Buyer's Information Sets and Nodes 
From the simple example as shown above, the buyer agent can conjecture the 
realization probabilities of his decision nodes given that a particular seller's decision 
node has been reached and the private valuation of the seller as well as his Behavior 
Strategies are known. 
We now assume that the buyer's agent knows the optimal behavior strategies s 
of the seller agent. At the same time, the buyer agent has figured out his pure 
strategies for counteracting seller's actions. We consider a particular evolution of the 
game with the history denoted by At = (Ai, Xi, ,儿）(change), Xi^Q , 
fori < i < t - \ . The buyer agent would like to know the realization probability of a 
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particular Information SetI(cB = cr, At). When the buyer's private valuation CB does 
not take the value cr, the Information Set I(CB = cj. At) cannot be reached and the 
corresponding realization probability should be zero. Therefore, the private valuation 
of the buyer must be given by a . Furthermore, in order to realize the 
history At = (Ai, JI2, ,儿），the buyer agent's Pure Strategy must prescribe 6 at 
each information set in the form of I{CB - cr, Ai/b.....AI), for \<i <T. If the buyer 
agent (buyer) thinks that the Behavior Strategy of the seller agent (seller) is given by s, 
the buyer can calculated the realization of the information set I{cB = cr, At) by the 
following formula. 
f '-1 
P{I(cB = cr. At)} = R* (CS,CB 二 a) 1义2 儿-1)= Xi\dcs 
JCs /=1 
Similar to information set, we can also write down the realization probability 
of a particular node mI{cB = a. At). This probability is given by 
f-i 
P{X{cs = o),CB = cr, ^f)} = i? * (Cs = CO, CB = a) = co, XxXi..... Ai -1)=儿] 
；=1 
where is a possible value of seller's valuation. 
2.9.2 Realization probabilities for Seller's Information Sets and Nodes 
The functions as shown above are the realization probabilities of information sets and 
nodes for the buyer agent (buyer). Similarly, we can define realization probabilities of 
Information Sets and nodes for the seller agent (seller). 
We consider a particular evolution of the game with the history denoted 
by At = (Ai, A2, , /If -1),儿关 2 , for 1 < / < / - 1 . The seller agent would like to 
know the realization probability of the Information Set, I(cs = co, Zf-1). Clearly, the 
private valuation of the seller, Cs, must be given by co or otherwise the realization 
probability will be zero. Moreover, we assume that the Behavior Strategy of the buyer 
agent is given by/). If the optimal Pure Strategy of the seller's agent prescribes 儿 at 
the information set/(c^ = co, XxX.i.....几-1), fori < / < / - ! , the realization probability 
will then be given by 
P{l(cs = 6)，A -1)} = f (Cs = 0,CB) n/)[；R(CB, ；IA2…..；L) = 0VcB ……(*) 
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By similar principle, the realization probability of an Information set I{cs = (D,At- i^z^) 
should be given by 
P{/(cs = (O,AT-4)} = f R*(cs = Q),CB) B[7R{CB, ；li；^…..丄-1) = [；r(cs, AUz……儿）=0]dcB 
At the same time, the realization probability of decision node 
X{cs = o),CB = (J, At -1) should be given by 




P{X{cs = o),CB = <j, At -\(/>)] = R*(cs = o),cb = cr) b[7r(cB, h^i 儿-1) = (/>]Rb[7r{cB, hAi..…Aj) = 0] 
1=1 
2.10 Beliefs of the players in a One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
When we know the probability, R * ( c �C B ) , and suppose the seller agent and buyer 
agent are using some particular strategies, we can determine the realization 
probabilities of Information Sets and nodes. Based on these realization probabilities, 
we can formulate the belief of a player on his opponent's private valuation. At a 
particular stage of the game, the belief of a player to opponent's valuation can change 
his estimate on the realization probability of a unicursal path subsequent to that stage 
of the game. Thus, it is very important for us to leam the method for evaluating and 
readjust this belief as the game proceeds. 
Undoubtedly, this "subjective" belief should not be equal to the initial 
probabilities/? * (CS, CB) . We will cite the belief of the seller agent as an example to 
illustrate this point. When the buyer has a low valuation on the product, the buyer 
agent (buyer) is more likely to reject high-price offers from the seller agent. On the 
other hand, when the buyer has a high valuation on the product, his agent is more 
likely to accept high-price offer. According to the corresponding behavior, the seller 
agent (seller) may think that the buyer has a low or high valuation on the product. 
When the negotiation proceeds, the seller agent should adjust his belief on the buyer's 
valuation based on the behavior of the buyer agent. The seller agent can use his initial 
subjective probabilities and the realization probabilities of the imiciirsal path to 
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formulate a new subjective belief of his opponent. Buyer's belief on seller's private 
valuation can also be figured out in similar way. 
In Game Theory for extensive game with incomplete information, there are 
many theorems to deal with the belief of players. We will first look at the case of the 
seller agent and see how he can figure out his belief in the game. 
2.10.1 Seller's belief in the One to One Negotiation Model 
As we have mentioned in section 2.7, there are two types of information sets that the 
seller agent (seller) can situate at. They are I{cs = a, A(t - o) and / (p = or, J(f-i)於）， 
where A GCS. Because the second case represents that the game has been terminated, 
we are not interested in that case and will concentrate our effort on/(cs = a, A(t -1)). If 
the realization probability of I(cs = a, A(t -1)) is greater than zero, the history of 
actions At-\ should be played by the seller agent and the behavior strategy of the 
buyer agent (buyer) should prescribe him to reject all t - \ offers during the 
negotiation. When we refer to Section 2.9.2, we have learnt that the realization 
probability of this Information Set should be given by 
P{I(cs = or, A -1)} = j* * {cs = a,CB) AiAi……儿)=0]dcB JCfl 1=1 
Suppose the seller agent is in an Information set I{cs - a, Act - ”) and he wants to 
evaluate the probability that his opponent private valuation will have a value equal 
too". The chance should be given by the realization probability that the seller is at a 
decision node X(a , a, At -1) given that he is i n / ( c s = a, A(t -1)). From section 2.9.3, 
the realization probability of a, At -1) is 
P{X(cs ^A,CB = <7, At-\)} = R*(cs = a , CB = cr) Y\b[7I{cB = A, AUi……儿）=6] 
1=1 
where or g Gand CTGCB. The belief (probability) that we want to calculate can then 
be derived from Bayes ’ Rule 
R * (a, a) [；r(cr, ；U�……儿)=6] 
"{CB = a I I(a, At _ 1)} = 0 ……(**) 
R*(a,CB)hb[；r(cB, AiAi…..；L) = 0]dcB 
The seller's belief on buyer's valuation is simply a conditionally probability function. 
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Readers should note an important point in the definition of seller's belief. The 
seller's belief conditioned on information sets which are on the equilibrium paths. If 
the equilibrium strategies of the buyer agent and seller agent prescribe the game to 
follow a unicursal path such that the Information Set can be reached at some stage of 
the negotiation game, this Information Set is said to be on the equilibrium path. The 
above probability is calculated with an assumption that the information set I(o), At -1) 
is on the equilibrium paths. As a result, we can insure that the denominator of (**), 
R"^ {a,CB)Y\b[7r{cB, XxXi.....Ai) = 0]cicB, is greater than zero and the belief is well 
JCb 7=1 
defined. 
However, what will happen when this information set is not on the unicursal 
path which is prescribed by the equilibrium strategy. Clearly, the definition of seller's 
belief will no longer be given by the equation as shown above. When the Information 
Set that we are interested in is off the equilibrium path, there are additional 
specifications for the definition of belief. Moreover, these specifications may be 
different in various game setting. When we tackle more concrete bargaining problems 
in later sections, we will define and further clarify those properties of seller's belief. 
In previous paragraphs, we have already discussed the seller's belief on buyer's 
private valuation in an information set /(a, At-\). In section 2.7.2.1, we mentioned 
that there are two types of Information Set for the seller. One is /(or, ^r - i ) while the 
other is/(or, At -1 於).Because all the decision nodes in I (a. At - are terminal nodes, 
we need not consider the belief of the seller in I(a, At - . In other words, as the 
game will terminate anyway, it is not necessary to "plan" on that stage. . 
2.10.2 Buyer's belief in the One-to-One Negotiation Model 
After we have discussed the belief of the seller agent (seller), we will shift our focus 
on the belief of the buyer agent (buyer). The formulation of buyer's belief is very 
similar to that of the seller's. In section 2.7.2.2, we have learnt that there are two types 
of buyer's Information Set, namely I(CB, A(T -”Q) and /(CB. At) . Now, we will 
consider the belief in/(CB, At). Suppose the buyer agent thinks that the seller agent 
should use a behavior strategy called s . We denote h , Xi , , Ax to be the 
components of a particular history, At (Ai'^Q for 1 < / < / - 1 and may be equal to 
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Q ). Clearly, the buyer agnet's strategy should be 0 at each Information Set 
I(cB,义1义2……儿），for 1 < / < / - 1 , such that the Information set I(CB, At) can be 
reached. The realization probability of the Information set /(cs, At) will then be given 
by: 
t 
P{I{CB = cr. At)] - R* (Cs, CB = (T)]~f s[7t{Cs, h.....义-1)=儿 J/Cs Jcy 丄 
1=1 
From section 2.9.1, the realization probability of buyer's node cr, At) is given by 
t 
P(X{a, a, At)) = R* (CS :CC,CB 二 cr)]~[ 5[；r(c. ^a, Ai ……儿-1)=儿]. 
i=\ 
Once again, if the seller agent's behavior strategies and the buyer agent's pure 
strategies can actualize this information set I(CB = cr, At) (i.e. I{CB = <j, on the 
equilibrium path), the belief of the seller is given by Bayes ’ Rule as follow: 
t 
R*(a, s[7r(cs - a , X\ 儿-1)=儿] 
^{cs = a 11{CB - CT, At)}= — 
R * (Ci, CB = (T)]~[ s[7r{cs, h .•…At-\) = Ai^lcs 
If the information set I{CB = <t, At) is on the equilibrium path, the denominator 
of iLi{cs - a I I{cB = (T, At)} will not be zero and the buyer's belief is well-defined. 
Once again, we have not specified the belief of the buyer agent if he is in an 
Information Set which is off the equilibrium path. When we illustrate more concrete 
examples in later chapter, we will mention this kind of belief. 
Belief is very important in our One-to-One Negotiation game. From the game 
theoretical perspective, players are in Information sets and they do not process exact 
information on the bargaining process. Because there are uncertainties in opponents' 
private valuation, player cannot formulate the strategy of his opponent by considering 
the exact outcome of his actions. On the other hand, when a player learns the private 
valuation of his opponents, he knows the decision node that he is in and all his 
Information Sets in the game are singleton set. From any singleton information set, 
the sub-game will form a proper sub-game and the corresponding information set (i.e. 
the decision node) will become the vertex of this sub-game [13]. At this singleton 
Information set, he can use opponent's behavior strategy and the utility at terminal 
nodes to calculate the expected payoff when he is using a particular pure strategy. 
Since he knows his expected payoffs under different pure strategies, he can use 
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backward induction or dynamic programming methodologies for solving the game. 
However, in a random vector model, the incomplete information of the game has been 
modeled as imperfect information of the players. As a result, some or all information 
sets are non-singleton information sets. When a player is in one of these non-singleton 
information set, he thinks that he is at one of the decision nodes of the set. Therefore, 
the subsequent game, which started from a decision node inside a non-singleton 
Information Set, should be regarded as an improper siib-game\\7>\ The player does 
not know the (expect) payoff when different combination of future actions are used. 
However, when the player exploits the belief in an information set, we can 
convert the improper sub-game to a proper sub-game. The belief specifies the 
probability that the player is within a particular node of the Information Set. The 
player can calculated the expected payoff of each particular node under a particular 
subsequent strategy and use the belief to calculate the "final" expected payoff of the 
Information set. We can then obtain an extended proper sub-game which is quite 
similar to a proper sub-game [4], In this extended proper sub-game, the player can 
formulate his expected payoff, evaluate the Sequential Equilibrium and see which 
combination of seller agent's and buyer agent's strategies can form the equilibrium. 
The above paragraphs have already mentioned the formulation of players' belief 
in the One-to-One Bargaining process. Players' belief is important in deriving the 
expected payoff. Later on, we will talk about the concept of sequential equilibrium 
- and illustrate its relation with optimal strategies. 
2.11 Sequential Equilibrium of the One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
As we have mentioned in previous sections, our basic objective is to evaluate the 
strategies which form the Sequential Equilibrium. Sequential equilibrium in a game 
with incomplete information is very similar to Nash equilibrium in a game with 
complete information [12]. In a game with complete information, players have no 
incentive to shift their strategies when the strategies form a Nash equilibrium. 
In a game with incomplete information, each player is said to possess an 
assessment. The assessment consists of two elements and is denoted by iju, v) where 
// is the belief of the player on opponent's valuation in his Information Sets while v 
(either 5 or^ ) is his Pure/Behavior Strategies in the Game. As we have already 
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explained each element of seller's and buyer's assessment, we will skip their details 
and concentrate our effort on defining the sequential equilibrium in the One-to-One 
Negotiation Model. An explanation of the sequential equilibrium may be given as 
follow. 
By using the belief in an Information Set, we can estimate the realization 
probabilities of terminal nodes and the corresponding payoff at each information set 
and under different combination of strategies. Given this realization probabilities, the 
player can determine payoff and determine whether a combination of seller's agent or 
buyer's agent strategies can form Sequential Equilibrium. When the belief of the 
players is formulated from strategyies such that the Sequential Equilibrium is attained, 
the combination of belief and strategies is said to form a sequential equilibrium. 
The above definition of sequential equilibrium is relatively vague and confusing. 
However, the concept cannot be best elucidated if we do not use some concrete 
example for illustration. At this stage, we can simply say that a sequential equilibrium 
consists of beliefs which determine the probability distribution of opponent's 
valuation at various stages of the game and strategies which can form the equilibrium. 
The beliefs and strategies in a sequential equilibrium are consistent in a sense that the 
beliefs are formed by the strategies and the strategies is optimal under the beliefs as 
specified. In Chapter 3, we will try to solve a two stage negotiation model. We will 
further clarify the concept of sequential equilibrium in that context. 
2.12 Applying GT for solving Negotiation Problem 
We have already illustrated the basic structure of our One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
The basic assumptions and the rules of the negotiation are discussed in section 2.2 and 
2.3 respectively. The payoff functions of players when a deal can be made are defined 
in section 2.4 and 2.8. Finally, we have tried to model the One-to-One negotiation in a 
Dynamic Game with Incomplete information. Concepts such as game tree. 
Information Set, strategies, belief and sequential equilibrium are introduced. Indeed, 
we want to find a sequential equilibrium in our One-to-One Negotiation Model. Once 
the sequential equilibrium can be found, the players should follow the strategies 
which form the equilibrium. 
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In chapter 3, we will try to solve a concrete example of One-to-One Negotiation 
for its sequential equilibrium. Strategies for the seller's agent and buyer's agent will 
then be prescribed. 
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Chapter 3 
Two Stage One-to-One Negotiation Model 
In the previous chapter, we have use the Game Theory to model our One-to-One 
Negotiation Process. We have learnt that Sequential Equilibrium consists of two parts: 
belief and strategies to be used of players. If the player's strategy deviates from the 
strategy prescribed by the Sequential Equilibrium, his payoff will decrease. 
In the following sections, we will illustrate the methods for finding a sequential 
equilibrium in a particular case of One-to-One Negotiation. The situation of the game 
is very similar to that of [23]. When a buyer's wants to purchase a particular product, 
he delegates his buyer agent to shop for him. This buyer agent will browse the web 
and find potential seller agent. When it encounters a potential seller agent, it will use 
some pre-specified protocol to request the product. If the product required is available, 
the seller agent will reply and propose an offer for the buyer agent. After the buyer 
agent has received the offer from the seller agent, it can decide whether to accept or 
reject this offer. If the buyer agent regards the offer as favorable, it will accept the 
offer. On condition that an agreement is reached, the negotiation will stop. 
Moreover, our game setting allows the buyer agent to "wait" for a better offer. 
When he receives an offer from the seller agent, he will judge its attractiveness. At the 
same time, he will evaluate the chance that the seller agent will make concession if he 
rejects the current offer. Suppose the buyer agent regards the initial offer as 
unattractive, he will reply to the seller agent with a negative acknowledgement. After 
receiving this negative acknowledgement, the seller agent will decide whether to 
continue the negotiation or not. He will continue the negotiation by proposing a 
second offer for the buyer agent. The buyer agent will then evaluate the second offer. 
No matter whether the buyer agent accepts or rejects this offer, the negotiation will 
terminate. 
Because the buyer agent wants to acquire the product at a lower price, he may 
ignore some "expensive" offers. If the buyer agent is too aggressive in the negotiation, 
he will end up in a failed negotiation. On the other hand, the seller agent wants to sell 
the product at a higher price such that he can gain more profit. If the seller agent 
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always asks for an "unreasonably" high price, the buyer agent will reject all the offers. 
Therefore, both players must strike a balance in their strategies. 
In the following sections, we will try to find the suitable strategies to be used 
by the players to achieve the Sequential Equilibrium. 
3.1 Notation used 
In the One-to-One Negotiation Model, seller and buyer are bargaining for a particular 
product. As we have mentioned in Assumption 2 of section 2.2.3, participants have 
their own private valuation on the product. We denote the valuation of seller and 
buyer by Cs andcs respectively. 
3.1.1 Physical Interpretation of Seller's and Buyer's valuation 
The physical interpretation of Cs can be conceived as follow. At the beginning of the 
negotiation, the seller will set a reserved price for the product. The reserved price may 
depend on the production cost of the product or/and the opportunity cost when the 
product is sold. Before we provide the justification on the following assumption, we 
would like to assume that both the seller agent and the buyer agent have common 
knowledge on the value of Cs . Clearly, the seller will know his own private 
valuation, Cs. For the case of the buyer agent, we suppose that there are some 
technique for it to check the identity of the seller agent and evaluate the its 
corresponding private valuation. When the buyer agent encounters a seller agent, he 
may realize the seller's identity by the communication protocol. For example, there is 
a field called sender in Contract Net Protocol [19] or KIF (Knowledge Interchange 
Format) [27]. By inspecting the sender's field and identify the seller, the buyer agent 
cm figure outc.. He may use his past experience or consult other agents on the value 
ofcs. If the analytic power of the buyer agent is sufficient, he can figure outc.. 
On the other hand, we assume that the seller agent does not know the exact 
value of CB. There are always a large number of buyers in the electronic marketplace. 
In most circumstances, identities of buyers are anonymous and the seller can hardly 
figure out the value of CB for a particular buyer. Even if he tries to consult other 
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agents for CB , he cannot expect that a trustworthy revelation can be obtained. 
Therefore, the seller and seller agent does not know the private valuation of the buyer. 
Although the seller does not know the exact value ofcs, he may conjecture the 
probability if CB is of a particular value and assign a probability distribution over the 
possible value of CB . As we have mentioned in section 2.6.1, this conjecture, or more 
precisely, this probability distribution is called the initial belief of seller agent on 
buyer's valuation, denoted b y P { C B ) = *{CB), I <CB <h . (Because the valuation of 
seller is a known value rather than a random variable, we simplify the notation of 
R * {CS, CB) mioR * {CB) .) The valuation CB lies within the open interval of {h, I). 
The seller agent may conjecture the probability distribution of CB in the 
following way. When this agent transacts with his customers, it will observe a large 
amount of buyers' behavior. It can then sample and conjecture on the probability 
distribution function of CB . 
After we have definedc^,cb,/ and h, we will present an important axiom in 
our One-to-One Negotiation Model. 
Axiom 3.1 In our One-to-One Bargaining Model, we assume I >CS i.e. the lowest 
possible value of CB is higher than the value CS. 
The axiom states a natural phenomenon in bargaining. Suppose CS> I , 
then P{cB < C5} > 0 , i.e. the probability that the buyer's valuation is less than the 
seller's is positive. Clearly, the seller will not propose an offer which is less than the 
value ofci. If CB<CS, the offers of the seller will always be greater thanes and the 
buyer will never accept these offers. Failed negotiation will occur. As a result, when 
the seller and the buyer have incentive to participate in the negotiation, CB should 
always be greater thanc^. In other word, I cannot be less thanc^, which agrees with 
the axiom. 
3.1.2 Discount Factor in the One-to-One Negotiation 
Apart from the private valuation of the players, we want to represent another 
important factor in the negotiation process (specifically for this example). This 
important factor is the discount factor on the product which is denoted . In our 
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every day experience, discount or depreciation in the value of a product are usually 
observed. The seller usually charges a higher price when the product is brand-new, 
but a lower price when the product becomes outdated. Some other reasons may also 
provide the physical interpretation of the discount factor. 
When the bargaining proceeds, there may be some depreciation on the value 
of the product. Intuitively, both the seller and the buyer want to make a deal as soon 
as possible. If the negotiation proceeds to multiple numbers of rounds, they may feel 
very "annoying". Whether a deal can be made in the first round or after a tedious 
process of negotiation will affect the players' subsequent utility on the deal. 
In our One-to-One negotiation model, we use the symbol 5 to denote the 
discount factor which quantifies players' "abhorrence" on prolonged negotiation or 
delayed commitment. In general, this discount factor may be represented by a time 
function, S :n ->R, where ri represents the number of round in the negotiation 
process. For example, if a deal have a monetary value of M and it is formed at the 
Tth round of the negotiation, the actual utility of this deal will be given hy d{T)*M . 
In subsequent paragraphs, we will assume that there is a linear discount factor 5 in 
each round of the negation such thatO < 5 <\. For example, if we denote P\ and Pi 
as the monetary payoff of a deal made in the first round and second round 
respectively, the actual payoff to the buyer will be given by CB-P\ and S{CB-P2) 
while that of the seller will be given by P] - Cs mdS(P2 - Cs). 
In later sections, we will see that the Sequential Equilibrium will be affected by 
the private valuation of the seller, the lowest and highest bound of buyer's valuation 
and discount factor of the game. Before illustrating this, we will try to formulate the 
One-to-One Negotiation Process in a Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information. 
3.2. Formulation of the two stage Negotiation 
As we have already mentioned in Chapter 2, a One-to-One Negotiation Process is a 
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information. If the maximal number of rounds in 
the negotiation is two, the bargaining process can be modeled by a three-tier game 
tree. The first stage (tier) of the game tree is played by Player 0. Because we assume 
that the seller's private valuation is a known value, Player 0 will only play the chance 
move which determines the value of CB . By the "random draw" of player 0, the game 
4 6 
tree will diverge from the vertex and each diverted branch will terminate at a node 
which can be regarded as the vertex of an extended proper sub-game. Corresponding 
to each vertex, the sub-game will have different parametric value once and the 
subsequent move can be considered as a two-stage Negotiation process. We will now 
discuss this two-stage Negotiation process. 
3.2.1 First Stage of the Negotiation Process 
The first stage of the game tree starts at Information Sets in the form of/(cs), or 
simply, I as Cs is a well-known fixed value. These Information Sets contain vertexes 
of extended proper sub-games. Moreover, this stage consists of two moves, one by the 
seller agent and one by the buyer agent. Because the seller does not know the exact 
private valuation of the buyer, he will not realize which decision node, X(cs, CB) , or 
simply, X{CB)that he is situating at. However, he has the belief that his opponent's 
valuation should follow a probability distribution which is given by * (CB) = P(CB), 
over the interval (/, h). For example, when the seller is at his first move, the 
probability that the seller is situating at a particular node, X{CB = <j), should be given 
by the probability p(cB = cr). 
From the Information Set I , the seller will decide the first offer, a\, to the 
buyer. As the buyer knows the exact private valuation of seller, buyer's decision 
nodes are contained in Singleton Information Set. (Buyer's decision nodes should 
have the form X(cs, CB, AI) or simply X(CB, A\)). At these decision nodes, the buyer 
agent will determine whether to accept or reject (i.e.没）the offer of the seller 
agent proposed in the first stage. After the buyer agent has made a move at the 
decision nodes ai), the first stage of the game tree completes. 
The first stage of the game tree can end in two different ways. If the buyer 
agent accepts the seller agent's offer, the game tree will terminate. On the other hand, 
if the buyer agent rejects the seller agent's offer, we will enter into the second stage of 
the game tree. Therefore, at each decision node of the buyer, one branch will lead to a 
terminal node while the other will lead to the second stage of the game tree. 
3.2.2 Second Stage of the Negotiation • 
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The second stage of the game tree is similar to the first stage. In this stage, both the 
seller agent and the buyer agent will know the value of the first offer, a\ (the 
assumption of perfect recall). The seller agent is in the information set I{cs, ax) or 
simply I{a\) as Cs is a well-known value. Because the value of a\ lies within the open 
interval of (/, h), there is an infinite number of / (a i ) . While the seller agent's decision 
nodes have the form X{CB, a\) , the buyer agent's nodes should have the 
form X{cB, aiai). The action space and hence the action branches of these decision 
nodes will be equal to that in the first stage. Although the rules and action spaces in 
the and round of the negotiation are equal, the seller agent's belief on the 
private valuation of the buyer should be different as buyer's decision on accepting or 
rejecting the seller agent's first offer should have some implication on his private 
valuation. The seller agent's belief in the first round of the negotiation is given 
by P{CB) . However, in the second round of the negotiation, the seller agent will use 
buyer agent's decision in the first round to modify his belief on P{CB) . If the tmicursal 
path of the game tree is on the equilibrium path, the seller agent can use Bayes’ Rule 
to adjust his belief on buyer's private valuation. With the same notation as in section 
2.9.1, the belief is given by iu{cb | I{cs, ai)). Because ens a well-known value, we 
will simplified the notation of seller's belief as juicB | a\). 
The first offer of the seller agent and the response of the buyer agent will 
determine which Information Set I{a\) will be reached at the second stage of the 
negotiation. At this stage, the optimal action of the seller agent should depend on the 
Information &//(ai)that the seller agent is situated in. We can express the second 
offer as<32[/(ai)]. However, if there is no ambiguity, we will simply denote the second 
offer as ai in order to simplify the notation. 
Owing to the asymmetric of information and similar to the first stage of the 
negotiation, buyer agent's decision nodes in the second stage of the negotiation 
should lies within singleton Information Sets. Two branches will originate from each 
Information Set of the buyer; one for the "accept" action while another for the "reject" 
action. No matter which action branch is chosen by the buyer agent, the branch will 
end up in terminal nodes and the corresponding utilities are marked in the nodes. 
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3.3 Buyer Strategy in a Two stage Negotiation 
After we have discussed the model of two stage negotiation, we will try to evaluate 
the Sequential Equilibrium of the game. We focus at the strategy of the buyer first. As 
we know that for a particular strategy to be used in the Sequential Equilibrium, the 
seller will get a less favorable payoff when his actions are deviating from that strategy. 
Suppose now, the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent prescribed a\ to be used in 
the first round and ai to be used in the information set I{a\\ where the seller agent and 
buyer agent do not know the value of a\ and ai at this stage. Given this unknown a\ 
and ai, can we express the property of buyer agent's equilibrium strategy in term of 
this variable a\ and ai. In this section we will try to do this. 
In this section, we will show that in each round of the negotiation, the buyer's 
agent should devise a threshold valuation such that he should accept the seller offer if 
the threshold valuation is less than or equal to the private valuation of the buyer. 
Moreover, this threshold valuation can be express in term of the unknown a\ and al. 
In our One-to-One negotiation model, the threshold valuation in the second round 
should be set at ai. The threshold valuation in the second round should be the 
maximum of a\ and the value of the expression, . We will proceed to derive 
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these results in the following sub-sections. 
3.3.1 Property of Equilibrium Strategy in the Second Round of Negotiation 
The threshold valuation of the buyer at the second round of the negotiation is the most 
trivial and it is given by the following proposition 
Proposition 3.1 Suppose ai is the second offer of the seller. If < cb , the buyer 
agent will accept ai. Otherwise, the buyer agent rejects a2and a failed negotiation 
results. 
The above proposition can be explained very easily. When the seller agent 
proposes an offer ai in the second round of the negotiation, the value of this offer may 
be higher than, equal to or lower than the buyer's private valuation cb . If a2 > CB and 
the buyer agent accept the offer, he will incur a loss in the transaction because the 
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non-discounted utility of the buyer is CB - ai which is less than zero. Therefore, the 
buyer agent will not accept an offer ai such thatai > CB . Failed negotiation will result. 
On the other hand, if a2<CB, the buyer agent can get a positive payoff by accepting 
the offer but a zero payoff by rejecting the offer. Therefore, he will accept an offer ai 
such that his utility will be cb - <22 which is greater than zero. As the buyer agent will 
get a less favorable payoff when any of his strategy deviates from this property, the 
equilibrium strategy of the buyer agent should satisfy this property. 
3.3.2 Property of Equilibrium Strategy in the First Round of Negotiation 
Although the strategy of the buyer agent in the second round of the negotiation is very 
trivial, it is more difficult to determine his optimal strategy in the first round. In 
general, if the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent prescribes a handsome 
concession in the second round, the buyer agent should reject the first offer and wait 
for the second offer. On the other hand, the concession of the seller agent in the 
second round may be so small that it cannot compensate the discount factor of 
delayed commitment. Suppose now, the seller agent will provide two unknown offer 
a\ and ai in the first and second round of the negotiation. Then we will derive the 
threshold valuation of the buyer agent in the first round of the negotiation in term of 
a\ and ai. 
Definition 3.1 For arbitrary a\ and a i , we define the quantity c * (ai, a i )= . 
1 
Without any ambiguity, we may simplify the notation of c * (ai, ai) asc*. {Note: for 
unknown a\ andai , the value of c *(ai, ai) may be less than or equal to/ . It may also 
be greater than or equal to/z.) 
Now, we define a quantity c\{ai, ai) to be the threshold valuation of the buyer 
agent in the first round of the negotiation such thatci(ai, ai) = max{c * (ai, ai), a\}. 
When there is no ambiguity, we may simplify the notation of c\{a\, ai) by c\ . 
Following is a very important proposition in our two stage negotiation game. 
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Proposition 3.2 Suppose now, the buyer agent assume that the seller agent will 
provide a\ as the first offer and ai as the second offer. If the buyer's private valuation 
on the product, CB , is greater than or equal to c\, the buyer agent will accept the seller 
agent's first offer a\. Otherwise, he will simply i g n o r e . 
Proof Now, if CB > c\ 




...It is profitable to accept ai. 
Moreover, cs > ci = ai > c * (ai, ai) -
ai-dai e� ^ 
...CB > <=> ( 1 - O)CB >A\-oa2 
\-5 
<=> CB - ai > d{cB-a2) 
Accepting the first offer a\ will be more profitable than accepting the 
second offer a2. 
.•• The buyer agent will accept the first offer. 
Case (ii) c * (ai, ai) > a\ . Then, by the definition of the threshold 
valuation, ci = c * {a\, ai). 
� i \ �a i — fe 
N o w , CB>C\OCB>  
1 - 5 
<=> (1- 5)CB >a\-Sa2 
O {CB -a\)>5 (CB 一 AI) 
The first offer ai is as least as or more profitable than the second 
o f f e r . At the same time, CB>C*(a\, ai) > a\. The deal is profitable. 
»» 
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...The buyer agent will accept the first offer. 
• 
The above proposition states precisely the condition when the buyer agent will 
accept the first offer and ignore the second offer. This should undoubtedly be a 
condition impose on the equilibrium strategy of the buyer agent. 
The threshold valuation of the buyer agent in the r^ and round specifies the 
conditions that the equilibrium strategy of the buyer agent should satisfy, given that 
the seller uses a\ as the offer and ai as the second offer. Also, the value of 
a\ and can be any value within the close interval of [/，h]. Clearly, the conditions 
alone do not reveal too much on the actual decision of the buyer agent. However, we 
have express the strategy of the buyer agent in a handy format in term of ai and ai. 
We will show that we can then form the payoff functions of the bargaining game in 
term of a\ and ai, optimize the payoff function, find the equilibrium strategy of the 
seller with well-defined a\ and ai and subsequently leam the equilibrium strategy of 
the buyer agent. In the following section, we will shift our focus on properties of 
seller agent ’ s equilibrium strategies. 
3.4 Strategic Combination of the seller agent 
Before we discuss the equilibrium strategy for the seller agent, we will define a 
concept called Strategic combination. 
Definition 3.2 A Strategic Combination of the seller agent is denoted by (ai，a2) such 
that a\ is the seller agent's first offer while ai (if the negotiation proceeds to the 
second round) is the seller agent's second offer in a bargaining game. 
In our case, a\ and ai may take any value in the close interval [/, h]. Since the 
Strategic Combination is a two tuple on a\ and ai, the possible combination of 
(ai, a2)wiU be very large. In the following section, we will define three major types 
of seller agent's strategies which the seller agent may use in our One-to-One 
negotiation model. 
3.4.1 Three Major types of Strategic Combination " 
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In Definition 3.1, we have defined a quantity c*by the expression - . At the 
1 - ^ 
same time, we remember that the threshold valuation of the buyer agent is defined 
by c\ = max{c*, a\}. When the private valuation of the buyer agent is less than the 
threshold valuation c\, the buyer will not accept the first offer, a\ . For strategic 
combination (ai, ai) such thatc* > /?, the threshold valuation c\ will take the value of 
c* . As a result, the threshold valuation will always be greater than the buyer’s 
valuation and the buyer agent must reject the first offer and the seller's expected 
payoff in the first round of the negotiation will always be zero. We defined those 
strategic combination (ai, ai) such that c* > as follow. 
Definition 3.3a Those Strategic Combinations (ai, ai) such that c* > /zare called Type 
A Combination. 
For strategic combinations (ai, ai)such thatc* <// , we would like to sub-divide 
them into two broad classes. We define two major types of Strategic Combination as 
follow. 
Definition 3.3b Those Strategic Combinations (a\, ai) such that h> a\> a2>l and 
c*</7 are called Type B Combination. 
If the seller agent uses this type of strategy, he is willing to make concession in 
the second round of the negotiation. 
Definition 3.3c Those Strategic Combinatiom (ai, ai) such that h>a2>a\>l and 
a\<h are called Type C Combination. 
If the seller agent uses this type of strategy, he will fix or raise the price of the 
product after the first round of the negotiation. Now, we want to show that the three 
types of strategic combinations represent all possible Strategic Combination. 
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Proposition 3.3 Type A, Type B and Type C Combinations represent exhaustively all 
possible Strategic Combinations. 
Proof. For Type C Combinations, 
士 ai-Sai a\-da\ , c* = < -a\<h 
\-5 \-5 
Therefore, Type B and Type C Combination represent all strategic 
combination such that such thatc*</7. The result then follows in a 
very trivial way. 
• 
In Section 3.3, we have already discussed the best response of the buyer agent 
for all Strategic Combination, {a\, ai). These best responses should be regarded as 
the condition of the equilibrium strategy of the buyer agent in our One-to-One 
negotiation. Since the participants of the negotiation are rational, we assume that the 
buyer agent will follow this condition in accepting or rejecting seller agent's offer. 
According to the condition, he will response differently when the seller 
agent's equilibrium strategy should be a particular type of strategic combinations. 
When the seller agent is using Type A Combinations, the equilibrium strategy 
prescribes the buyer agent to reject the first offer of the seller agent. When the seller 
agent is using Type C Combinations, the equilibrium strategy prescribes the buyer to 
accept the first offer or accept nothing. Finally, when the seller is using Type B 
Combinations, the buyer may or may not accept the first offer, depending on the 
threshold valuation and his own private valuation. 
In our one-to-one negotiation game, we also want to find seller agent's best 
responses (if any) to the equilibrium strategy of the buyer agent which we derived in 
section 3.3. We define the equilibrium strategy (i.e. best response) of the seller agent 
in response to that of the buyer agent as Type A, Type B and Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution when the seller is restricted to use Type A, Type B and Type C 
Combinations respectively. In the following sections, we will draw some insight on. 
Type A, Type B and Type B restricted equilibrium solution. 
3.5 Properties of Type A Restricted Equilibrium Solution 
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In the previous section, we learned that the buyer will reject the first offer when the 
seller is using a Type A Combinations. Because the buyer agent will reject the first 
offer of the seller agent, the seller agent must take this into account when he wants to 
find the best strategic combinations in the set of Type A Combinations. This section 
will show that, when the seller agent wants to find the best response to the equilibrium 
strategy of the buyer agent in the set of Type A Combinations, he only need to 
consider those strategic combinations in the form of (/?, ai) as possible candidate. 
Before we proceed to show our proposition, we want to justify our argument 
that the buyer agent will reject the first offer of the seller agent when he is using a 
Type A Combination. As we have mentioned in Proposition 3.2 that buyer agent will 
ignore the first offer if his private valuation CB is less than the threshold valuation 
c\ When the seller agent is using Type A combinations, the value of c\ will be greater 
than or equal to//and, thus, CB must be less than c\. Therefore, the buyer agent will 
reject the first offer of the seller agent. 
Now we will show the existence of Type A Combinations and their properties. 
Then, we will show our proposition that the seller agent only need to consider those 
strategic combinations in the term of(/7, ai) for Type A restricted equilibrium solution. 
Lemma 3.1 For all possible value ofS, 3 ia\, ai) such thatc* > h. 
Proof. Now I <a\<h and I < ai < h 
Suppose the Strategic combination (ai, ai) has a\ - h, then . 
ai-Sai h-Sai h-Sh , , , � 
= > =h (••• ai < h) 
\-S \-S \-S 
Any strategy combinations which is in the form of (h, ai) will 
make c* >/? which completes our proof. 
• 
Lemma 3.2 For Type A Combinations, a\ > ai except when ai = h . 
Proof. When a2<h 
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山 , a\ - dai , 




=> /? - a2 > /? - ai (••• 0 < 5 < 1 and ai < h) 
=> ai > a2 
When cii 二 h 
c* >/?<=> ai > /? 
however, by definition a\<h 
a\ = a2 = h 
• 
From Lemma 3.2, we leam that the seller agent will make concession in the 
second round of the negotiation when he is using Type A Combinations other 
than (/z, h). 
Before we illustrate Lemma 3.3, we want to define the term equally optimal to 
or more optimal than. When a strategic combinatioti ^ is equally or more optimal 
than another strategic combination 示,the seller agent can get a better payoff by using 
i than ^ when the buyer agent is using the corresponding equilibrium strategy. 
In Lemma 3.3, we show our proposition that any {a\, ai) in the set of Type A 
Combinations must be equally optimal to or less optimal than a particular Type A 
Combinations which is in the form (/z, ai'). 
Lemma 3.3 For every Type A Combinations {a\, ai) , there exists a strategic 
combination (/?, ^2') which is equally optimal to or more optimal than (ai, ai) (or in 
another word, the Type A restricted equilibrium solution should be in the form 
Proof Clearly, the Strategic Combination (/?, ai') must be equally or 
more optimal than the strategic combinations (h’ h) because the 
buyer will not accept the offers (/?, h) and the seller will get zero 
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i! 
payoff. We consider Type A Combinations other than (/?, h). By 
Lemma 3.2, we know that a\>a2. 
If the seller agent uses(ai, ai) such thatc* >h, the buyer agent's 
best response is to reject the offer in the round of the 
negotiation because = max{c*(ai,a2),ai} = c* , i.e. 
CB < c\ (by proposition 3.2). Moreover, as the seller agent is using 
a Type A Combination, 
c*>h 






•.. — < = — = h (Equality hold when a\ - h) 
5 5 h 
...The requirement a2<h can be satisfied. 
For/ < a \ < h , we can always find some a\ such that the requirement 
— - ~ ^ ^ > / is satisfied. Therefore, we can find an ai within the 
closed interval [/, h] such that / <a2< — ~ - ~ ^ ^ < h. 
5 . 
Suppose now (ai, ai) is still a Type A Combinations but we fixed the 
value of a\ and allow ai to move within its possible range. Because 
the buyer agent must reject the first offer of the seller agent, the 
seller's objective function in both the first and second round of the 
negotiation should be equal and given by, 
f (ai, ai) - f {ai) = S{a2 - Cs) p{cB)dcB 
subjected to the constraint ai < a\ < h and I <a2< — ^ ^ ^ . 
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Clearly, whenai=/7, —~(1 吵=h. The range of possible value 
S 
of ai is largest. In General, when 
l<a2'<h and < / <«2"<。丨 雄 < h, and a2''<a\ < h > 
are considered 
max/(a ; )>max/(a；) 
. . .For every Type A Combinations {a\, ai), there exists a strategic 
combination (h, ai) which is equally or more optimal. 
• 
Lemma 3.3 can be interpreted as follow. When the seller agent does not want 
the buyer agent to accept the first offer and ordains him to go to the second round of 
the negotiation, he will use a Type A Combinations. When the seller agent uses a first 
offer ai = h , he can "restrict" the buyer agent to play the second round of the 
negotiation and, at the same time, he has the largest freedom in choosing an optimal 
second offer ai Because of this freedom of choosing actions from a larger possible 
action space , {h, a-i) is equally or more optimal. 
Since any strategic combinations {a\, ai) such that c* > h must be less optimal 
than or equally optimal to a particular Type A Combinations in the form of(/?, ai')，we 
need not find Type A restricted equilibrium solution (if any) other than those in the 
form(/z, ai'). In later sections, we will try to find the best response in the set of Type 
A Combinations when the buyer's private valuation has a uniform distribution. Before 
we illustrate these examples, we will first analyze the properties of Type C and Type 
B restricted equilibrium solution. 
3.6 Properties of Type C restricted equilibrium solution 
This section will show that, when the seller agent is using Type C Combinations and 
wants to find the best response to the equilibrium strategy of the buyer agent, he only 
need to consider those strategic combinations in the form of (/, ai) as possible 
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candidate, where ai can be arbitrary. In the following paragraphs, we will proceed to 
show this result. 
By the Definition 3.3c, Type C Combinations requires h>a2>a\>l 
and a\<h. As we have proved in Proposition 3.3, c* < /? if h>a2>a\>l and a\ < h. 
We can show easily that the buyer agent's threshold valuation in the first round of the 
negotiation, ci, should be set at ai when he knows that the seller agent is using a Type 
C Combination. 
Lemma 3.4 If h>a2>a\>l and a\ < h, c\-a\. 
Proof. ••• c * (ai, ai) 二 ^ ^^~— < —~— = a\ (••• ai > a\) and 
\-d • 
c\ - max{c * (ai, ai), a\} 
...c\ = a\ 
• 
Because the threshold valuation is set atai, the buyer agent will accept the 
first offer if his private valuation is greater than or equal to a\. At the same time, if the 
seller agent is really using a Type C Combination such that ai is greater than a\, the 
buyer agent best response is to either accept the first offer or accept no offers at all. 
The reason for our argument is very trivial. For example, if the buyer agent does 
reject a\ but accept ai, his payoff, will be — which must be less than CB - a\. 
The buyer agent's equilibrium strategy is to reject the second offer whenever he has 
rejected the first offer. 
Because of the arguments stated in the previous paragraph, we can easily show 
that when the seller agent need to choose a best response in the set of Type C 
Combinations, he only need to consider those strategic combination which is in the 
form of (/, ai), where ai is arbitrary. 
Lemma 3.5 For all Type C Combinations, only (/, ai), I <ai < //can be candidate of 
Type C restricted equilibrium solution. 
Proof. From Lemma 3.4, we learned that the threshold valuation of the buyer 
agent will be given by c\-a\. « 
59 
Case (i), a\>l . Because the buyer's private valuation follow a 
probability distribution P{CB) over the interval (H, /) ’ the probability 
that the buyer agent may reject the first offer is greater than zero. 
When the buyer agent has rejected the first offer, the seller agent 
should have a belief that the buyer's private valuation is less than ai. If 
he provides a second offer ai such thata2 >afi, his expected payoff in 
the second round of the negotiation will be zero. As expected payoff is 
zero, ai such that ai > a\ must not be a best response to buyer's 
strategy in the second round of the negotiation. 
Case (ii), a \ = I . In this case, the probability that the buyer agent may 
reject the first offer is zero. The buyer agent must accept the first offer. 
So, it doesn't matter what <32 will be used in the second round of the 
negotiation. Therefore, (/, ai), I < cn < h can be candidate of Type C 
restricted equilibrium solution. 
• 
We should note that Lemma 3.5 is true as long as the buyer's private valuation 
follows a distribution p(CB) over the interval (/, h). In later section, we will find the 
best response of the seller agent to buyer agent's equilibrium strategy when the 
buyer's valuation follows a uniform distribution. We will reiterate the result of 
Lemma 3 .5 in that section. . 
After we have considered the properties of Type C restricted equilibrium 
solution, we will evaluate the property of Type B restricted equilibrium solution. 
3.7 Properties of Type B restricted equilibrium solution 
The format of the Type B restricted equilibrium solution is less obvious than that in 
the set of Type A and Type C Combinations. We must calculate the optimal solutions 
(if any) of the second round and first round payoff functions of the seller in order to 
find this equilibrium solution. In this section, we will deduce some properties of Type 
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B restricted equilibrium solution and write down the first and second round expected 
payoff functions when the seller agent is using Type B Combinatiom. 
As we have described the game tree of the negotiation game in Section 3.2, the 
seller agent is in an Information Set of the form I{a\) at the second round of the 
negotiation. As the seller agent will formulate his optimal second offer, ai, according 
to the Information Set l{a\) and the belief JLI�CB \ a\), the value of ai should depend 
ona\. Moreover, the equilibrium Strategic Combination of the seller will also depend 
on the threshold valuation of the buyer agent. As the threshold valuation of the buyer 
agent is a ftinction of a\ and ai , we should realize that there are some 
interrelationships between a\ and ai. 
In the following sections, we will first express ai in term of a\ or some constant 
parametric value. Then, we will derive the behavior strategy of the buyer agent and 
the seller agent's belief of the second round of the negotiation because these two 
elements are pre-requisites in the formulation of payoff functions. After we have 
calculated these two elements, we will evaluate the payoff functions if the seller in the 
ist and 2nd round of the negotiation when his agent is using a Type B Combination. 
3.7.1 Relations between a\ and ai in Type B Combinations 
Lemma 3.6 A Type B Combination{a\, ai) should have the following constraints: 
i. If I <a\<h-5{h-l) and I <a2<a\, 
ii. If h-S(h-l)<a\<h and — - ^ ^ <a2<a\ 
5 . 
Proof. Now, h-5{h-l) = {\-S)h + Sl >{\-S)l+ Sl = l 
:.h-5{h-l)>l 
As h-5{h-l) is less than h, we have h > h - S(h -1) > I. Therefore, 
the expressions / <ai < h - S { h - I ) and 
h - S(h -1) < a\ < h represents all possible range of a\. 
Now, the restrictions on Type B Combinations are h>a\>a2>l 
and c*<h. 
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山 , a\-Sai , 
c^ <ho < h 
l-S 




�’ ，， ， ,a\-{\- S)h <71 - (1 - S)a\ , 
Vai such that l<a\<h,——^—<——^= o o 
， u u , , J ax-{\-5)h ...3a2 such that h> a\> a2>l and ai > . 
Now we consider the following cases: 
i. h>ax>h-5(h-l), 
ax>h-5{h-l)c>ax>i\-5)h + dl 
oax-(\-5)h>Sl 
a i - ( l - 5 ) h , 
o — — - — — — > / 
J 
, , � a i - ( l — 5 ) / ? � , 
'：h>a\>a2>l a n d ai > > I 
5 
, , � ai - (1 - 5)h 
\^h>a\>h-5{h-l), a\>a2> — 
5 . 
ii. if h-5{h-l)> a\>l, 
h-d{h-l)>a\oa\-{\- 5)h < 31 
a^-(\-5)h , 
o — < / 
, , , , a i - (1 - 5)h 
'：h>a\>a2> I a n d a! > I > — 
5 
.".If h-5(h-l)>a\>l and a\>a2>l ^ 
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...A Type B Combination {a\, ai) should have two constraints: (i) 
when h>a\>h-d{h-l) , a\>a2>—~(1 约办 , ( i i ) when 
0 
h-5{h-l)>a\ >/, a\> a2> I. 
• 
Because the relation between a\ and aim the expressionc* </? is not obvious 
enough, Lemma 3.6 provides more valuable insight on the relations between a\ andai . 
Although the upper bound of en will always beai，the lower bound will be different 
in the case when I <a\<h-5{h-1)ovh-5{h-l)<a\<h. Now, we terminate the 
discussion on the relation between a\ and ai. In the following section, we will find the 
behavior strategy of the buyer agent when the seller is using a Type B Combination. 
3.7.2. Behavior Strategy of the Buyer Agent 
In order to find the property of the Type B restricted equilibrium solution, we must 
first understand the equilibrium behavior strategy of the buyer agent. In this section, 
we will try to formulate the behavior strategy of the buyer. Once we have calculated 
the buyer agent's threshold valuation in the first round of the negotiation, the 
equilibrium behavior strategy can be derived in a straightforward manner. 
Lemma 3.7 If the seller agent uses a Type B Combination, the threshold valuation of 
the buyer agent is given bye*. 
Proof. By Definition, c\{a\, ai) = max{c * (ai, ai), a\} 
^, � ax-dai a\-6a\ , � 
••• c * (ai, ai) > = a\ (••• a\ > ai) 
\-S \-S 
...ci(ai, a2) = c* {a\, ai) or, ci = c * if there is no ambiguity 
• 
By Lemma 3.7, we can easily derive the following equilibrium behavior 
strategies of the buyer agent when the seller agent is using a Type B Comhination : 
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P {Buyer rejectsai} = p{cB)dcB and 
J! 
r'h 
P {Buyer accepts } = . p{cB)dcB 
Jc 
As long as the seller agent is using a Type B Combinations, the value ofc*is 
less than /^and greater than/and, therefore, the above probabilities are well defined. 
After we have formulated the behavior strategy, we will consider the seller agent's 
belief in the second round of the negotiation. 
3.7.3 Sellee Agent's Belief in the Second Round of the Negotiation 
In the second round of the negotiation, the seller agent will regard the buyer's private 
valuation as follow some probability distribution over the interval (h, /) . This 
probability distribution can be regarded as the seller agent's belief on buyer's private 
valuation in the second round of the negotiation. In this section, we will show that, if 
the seller agent uses a Type B Combinations in the form of (ai, ai), his belief on 
buyer's private valuation in the second round of the negotiation should be given by 
JU{CB I a i ) = , �~ for I <CB<C* 
and zero for all other values of CB . 
Suppose now the seller agent has proposed the first offer a\ and the buyer 
agent has just rejected it. Then, the negotiation will proceed to the second round. On 
receiving the negative acknowledgement of the buyer agent, the seller agent will 
adjust his belief on buyer's private valuation. The seller agent is convinced that the 
buyer's private valuation, CB , should be less than the threshold valuation. 
Set ‘ 
= — . By the Bayes，Rule as mentioned in section 2.9, the belief of the seller 
\-o 
agent can then be modified as follow. 
Lemma 3.8 When the seller agent is using a Type B Combination {a\, ai) and the 
game tree proceeds to an information set I{a\) such that, the seller agent's belief on 
the private valuation of the buyer, CB , should be given by 
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jLi{cB I a\) - f�CB�_ for / < CB < c * 
and zero for all other values of CB . 
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, the threshold valuation of the buyer agent should be 
given bye* when the seller agent is using a Type B Combination. If 
the buyer agent has rejected the first offer of the seller agent, his 
valuation must be less thane*. At the same time, CB must be greater 
than/. The belief can then be obtained by the Bayes' Rule. 
• 
If we denote the cumulative distribution function of buyer's private valuation 
as F{CB) , the seller agent's belief can be rewritten as 
‘ I � p(CB) ^ J ^ a\-Sa2 
• ⑷ 二 勒 
As / < c* < /?, the above expression is well defined. 
3.7.4 Seller's Payoff Function in the Second Round of the Negotiation 
After we have stated the seller agent's belief on buyer's private valuation in the 
second round of the negotiation, the following proposition states the seller's payoff 
function in the second round of the negotiation. 
Lemma 3.9 Suppose now the seller agent is using a Type B Combination in the form 
of {a\, a i ) . At the Information Set/(ai) , the payoff function of the seller agent at the 
second round of the negotiation should be given by 
f i a 2 ) = S{a2-Cs) 1 — ~ 广 2丄 
J a\-ai2] 
F  
_ I )_ 
At the same time, ai is subjected to the following constraints: 
i. if I <a\<h-5{h-l), l<a2<a\. 
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ii. h-5{h-l)<a\<h,�—0 —办 <ai<ax. 
o 
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, when the seller agent is using a Type B 
Combination {a\, ai), there are two constraints as listed in (i) and (ii) of 
this Lemma. We then proof the formula of the payoff function. 
Now, the first offer a\ has been offered by the seller agent and the 
buyer agent has rejected this offer. As the seller agent is using a Type B 
Combinations, the threshold valuation and the belief should be given 
respectively by Lemma 3.7 and 3.8. If the seller agent proposes ai as 
his second offer, the payoff in this round will be 
/i(a2) = 5{a2-Cs)P{buyer accepts ai) 
= Cs) ju(cB I a\)dcB (By Lemma 3.7, c\ = c*) 
=Siai — Cs)广严）dcB (By Lemma 3.8) 
f p{x)ds 
= 「 P ( C B � d C B 
F  
I 1 - 5 j 
Siai-Cs) 「厂广 a \ - d a 2 \ . 
^ F ——— -F(a2) 
r L 
I J 
： . f \{a2) 二 S(a2-Cs) 1 ——/"��}� 
„f a\ - oai 
F  
_ I )_ ‘ 
which completes the proof Lemma 3.9. 
• 
As we have restricted the seller agent to use Type B Combinations (or more 
precisely Type B restricted equilibrium solution with unknown a\ and ai), the 
restrictions of (i) and (ii) in Lemma 3.9 are necessary and significant. They have a 
great influence on the optimal solution derived from the payoff functions in Lemma 
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3.9. The ai(and subsequently the a\) as assumed to be prescribed by the Type B 
restricted equilibrium solution, derived from optimizing the payoff function /i(a2) 
without the constraints in (i) or (ii), may not belong to Type B Combinations. When 
we want to find the Type B restricted equilibrium solution, the restrictions of (i) and 
(ii) will prevent us from searching outside the set. 
When the seller is using a Type B Combination, the buyer may accept the first 
offer. We now consider the expected payoff function in the first round of the 
negotiation. 
3.7.5 Seller's Payoff Function in the First Round of the Negotiation 
The expected payoff function in the First Round of the Negotiation consists of two 
major components: the first component represents that the buyer agent 
acceptsai while the second component represents that the buyer agent rejects a\ but 
accepts a2. Therefore, the first round expected payoff function should be given by the 
following Lemma. 
Lemma 3.10 When the seller agent is using a Type B Combination in the form of 
(a\, ai), the expected payoff fiinction in the first round of the negotiation is given by 
/(ai, ai) = {a\ — Cs�j 译p(cB�dcB + S(a2- cOj" p{cB)dcB 
subject to the following two different sets of constraints: 
i. if I <a\<h-5{h-l), l<a2<a\. 
.. , c/f IN ^  , ai - ( 1 - S ) h 
11. If h-S(h-l)<a\<h, — <ai<a\. 
5 
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, when the seller agent is using a Type B 
Combination (ai, ai), there are two constraints as listed in (i) and (ii) of 
this lemma. We then proof the formula of the payoff function. 
The expected payoff of the seller agent should be given by 
f (ai, ai) = {a\ - Cs)P{ buyer accepts a\} + P{ buyer rejects a\] * 
d{a2 - Cs) * PJ buyer accepts ai} 
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.h pc* rc* P(CB) 
=(ai - Cs) p{cB)dcB + p(CB)dcB * S(a2 — Cs) * -J- dcB 
Jc* 山 j P ⑷ 办 
f/i rc* 
=(ai 一Cs) p{cB)dcB + 5{a2-Cs) p{cB)dcB 
Jc* Ja: 
which completes the proof of Lemma 3.10. 
• 
One may think that there are some redundancies between the first and second 
round payoff functions as the "second round expected payoff' appears in both Lemma 
3.9 and Lemma 3.10. However, when we examine those payoffs functions closely, we 
will know that there are some major differences in their nature. The second round 
/•c* P(CB^ 
expected payoff in Lemma 3.9 is given BYS(A2-CS) C/CB, while that in 
P(x)ds • 
(V* 
Lemma 3.10 is given hyS(a2-cs) p(cB)dcB. In the first case, it is certain that the 
buyer agent has already rejected the first offer of the seller agent. However, this kind 
of certainty is not guaranteed in the second case. When we optimize the payoff 
function in Lemma 3.9, we ensures that the corresponding value of ai is optimal 
when the first offer, ai, is fixed. On the other hand, when we optimize the payoff 
function in Lemma 3.10, we strikes a balance betweenai andai such that the sum of 
the expected payoff in the first round and second round is the most favorable. 
When we need to find the Type B restricted equilibrium solution, we will first 
optimize the second round payoff function and express the optimal ai (if any) as a 
function of the first offer ai or the constant parametric values of the negotiation model. 
Then we will substitute ai back into the first round expected payoff function. As the 
threshold valuation and behavior strategy of the buyer agent can also be expressed in 
term of a\ and ai, we can also reduce them to a single variable representation in term 
of a\. A function in a single variable a\ can then be formed. By optimize this single 
variable payoff fijnction, we can derive the optimal value of a\ (if any). The 
(ai, ai) so derived will be the Type B restricted equilibrium solution. 
3.8 Best Response of the Seller Agent to Buyer Agent's Equlibirum Strategy 
when CB is uniformly distributed „ 
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In previous sections, we have explored, in general, the properties of Type A, Type B 
and Type C restricted equilibrium solution when the buyer agent is using his 
equilibrium behavior strategy in Section 3.3. In the following section, we will try to 
find the solution(s) of these equilibrium solutions when buyer's private valuation, CB ’ 
follows a uniform distribution over the open interval (/, h). We will first explore the 
set of Type A Combinations. Then, we will find in the set of Type C Combinatiom. 
Finally, we will search the best solution in the set of Type B Combinations. After we 
have found the equilibrium solution(s) in each type of strategic combinations, we will 
compare the expected payoffs of each equilibrium solution. (Note: This expected 
payoff is evaluated at the start of the negotiation. It should be a sum of expected first 
round payoff and expected second round payoff as evaluating before the negotiation 
has been started.) The seller agent should choose to use the strategic combination 
which can result in the highest payoff. 
3.8.1 Solutions of Type A restricted equilibrium solution 
In Lemma 3.3 of section 3.5, we learned that we only need to consider strategic 
combinations in the form of(/7, ai). 
As buyer's private valuation follow a uniform distribution, the probability 
density function P(CB) should be given by — ^ . Now, we will try to calculate the 
h-l 
optimal value of ai such that(/7, ai) can be a Type A restricted equilibrium solution. 
/? + Cs 
Proposition 3.4a For / > (/?, /)is a Type A restricted equilibrium solution. 
2) 
Proof. Now, for the strategic combination {h, ai), 
. ax-Sai h-Sai h-Sh . 
c* = = > = h 
\-5 \-5 \-5 
ci = c* > /? 
Since CB<h<c\, the buyer agent best response is to reject the first 
offer of the seller agent. The seller agent's belief on the buyer's 
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valuation will still follow a uniform distribution over the interval 
(/, h). (As buyer agent must reject the first offer, no extra information 
is provided to review the buyer's actual valuation.) The payoff 
function is in the following form: 
f (ai) = S{a2- Cs) p{cB)dcB 
_ S{a2-Cs){h-a2) 
— 
( v CB follows a uniform distribution over (h, I).) 
df (ai) _ S(-a2 + Cs + h-a2) 
• • 一 
dai h-l 
—5{h + Cs-2a2) 
- J^l 
For a2>l> " + , 圳 叫 < 0 . The function / (^2) is monotonically 
2 dai 
decreasing for the range I < ai < h. 
Therefore, (h, /) will be a Type A restricted equilibrium solution. 
(Clearly, (h, /) is within the set of Type A Combinations). 
• 
Some elaboration on the Proposition 3.4a must be made before we proceed to 
the next proposition. In Section 3.3, we have specified the conditions of equilibrium 
strategy of the buyer agent in the first and second round of the negotiation for 
unknown equilibrium strategic combinations(ai, ai) and in section 3.8 onward, we 
have further illustrate response (actions) of the buyer agent prescribed the equilibrium 
strategy should the seller agent be using Type A, Type B or Type C restricted 
equilibrium solution. Therefore, the buyer agent's strategies stated previously must be 
/? + Cs 
a best response to (h, /). Moreover, for / > ~ ( / ? , I) should be used rather than any 
other Type A Combinations as deviating from this strategic combination and using 
other Type A Combinations will result in less favorable payoff of the seller. Therefore, 
when the seller agent considers using strategic combination in set of Type A 
Combinations, he should use(h, I) to response to buyer's equilibrium strategy. 
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Although (/?, /) is the best among all Type A Combinations, the seller agent 
may also use a Type B or Type C Combination. Thus, we specify (h, /)as a Type A 
restricted equilibrium solution. We need to find the Type B and Type C restricted 
equilibrium solution. Then, we will compare these restricted equilibrium solution to 
see which results in the highest payoff. These kinds of derivation will be conducted in 
subsequent sections. 
Before we find the equilibrium solution in Type B and Type C Combination, 
/? + Cs 
we will find the Type A restricted equilibrium solution when/ < ^ . 
Proposition 3.4b {h,^^^^�will be a Type A restricted equilibrium 
solution. 
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3.4a, we know that 
dfjai) _5{h + cs-2a2) 
dai h-l 
For / < ^ < h, ^ ^ = 0 when ai = ^ ^ . Therefore, / (a2) is a 
2 dai 2 
maximum when ai • 
Therefore, (h, ^ will be a best response to the buyer agent's 
/? + Cs 
equilibrium strategies as specified in Section 3.3. (Clearly, ( / ? , — ) 
is within the set of Type A Combinations.) 
• 
After we have considered Type A restricted equilibrium solution, we will 
proceed explore other types of restricted equilibrium solution. 
3.8.2 Solution of Type C restricted equilibrium solution 
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In Lemma 3.5 of section 3.6, we have already stated that the Type C restricted 
equilibrium solution should be in the form(/ ,ai) , l<a2<h. We, therefore, state the 
following proposition without proof. 
Proposition 3.5 (l^ai), where ai is arbitrary is a Type C restricted equilibrium 
solution. 
3.8.3 Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution of the Seller Agent 
As we have mentioned earlier in section 3.7’ to find the Type B restricted equilibrium 
solution, we should first express the optimal value of ai in term of the first offer 
a\ and other parametric constants in the negotiation model. Then, we substitute the 
value of ai back into the first round expected payoff function. We will now attempt to 
illustrate the method. 
As the lower bound of ai depends on the range of value ofa i , we will divide 
the possible value of a\ into two different ranges. Within each range ofai , we will try 
to express the optimal second offer ai as a function ofai and/or other parameters such 
as /?, / , c. and . The result is given in Lemma 3.20a and 3.20b while a brief 
summary of Lemma 3.20a is given in Table 3.1 
, h + Cs 
l>  
2 
l<ai<h-5{h-l) a2 = I 
h — 6{h - /) < a i< /?, It is not favorable to use an ai such that 
(ai, a2) will be a Type B combination as 
the seller agent can get a more favorable 
payoff by using other equilibrium 
solution of other types of strategic 
combination when the buyer agent is 
using his equilibrium strategy. 
Table 3.1 Optimal aiin term of a\ and other parameters when / > ~ • 
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The corresponding result in Lemma 3.20b is summarized in Table 3.2. 
, h + Cs 
I < 
2 
l<ax<l + {\-5){l-Cs) a2 = l 
『 ^  
si<a\<h It is not optimal to use an ai such that {a\, ai) will be 
a Type B combinatioti as the seller agent can get a 
more favorable payoff by using other equilibrium 
solution of other types of strategic combination when 
the buyer agent is using his equilibrium strategy. 
21 - 5{l - Cs) + J5'' (/ - csf + 4(1 - S){h - If 
Note: 52 = 
2 
Table 3.2 Optimal aim term of a\ and other parameter when I < ^ 
In the following sections, we will derive these results in a step by step manner. 
3.8.3.1 Seller's Second Round Payoff Function when CB is uniformly distributed 
Suppose now, the buyer's valuation, CB , on the product is less than the threshold 
valuation ci(ai, ai) = max{c * (ai, ai), a\]. Then, by Proposition 3.2, the buyer agent 
will ignore the first offer a\ and proceed to the second round of the negotiation. In the 
second round of the negotiation, the seller agent is in an Information Set/(ai). The 
first offer of the seller agent, a\ , can be in the interval [l,h-5{h-l)) or 
[h-5{h-l\ h). As we have specified in Lemma 3.6, if the seller agent is using a 
Type B Combination, the value ofai should have different lower bounds under the 
different ranges of a\. Bearing this in mind, we will write down the payoff function in 
the second round of the negotiation when the seller agent is using a Type B 
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Combinations and his initial belief on buyer's private valuation has a uniform 
distribution over the open interval (/?, /). 
Lemma 3.11 When the buyer's private valuation has a uniform distribution over the 
interval (/, h) and the seller agent is using a Type B Combination (ai, ai) ’ the 
expected payoff function of the seller when he is in an Information Set l(a\) should 
be given by 
^ . \ 5{a2-cs){a2-a\) 
f xiai)— 
At the same time, ai should be subject to the following constraints: 
i. l<a\<h-d{h-l), I <a2<a\. 
ii. \ih-5{h-l)<ax<h,�-(1-句办 <“2<fl i . 
o 
Proof. By Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.9, we have those constraints as shown in 
(i) and (ii) and the following payoff function 
f^{a2)^d{a2-cs)\-
” a] - aai 
F  
_ I J. 
a\-Sa2 J 
XT 17/ 、 以 ( a i - S a i ' ] 
Now, and 气 
.•• / ⑷ ： 、 二 -
/ 
_ \ - S _ 




which completes the proof. 
“ • 
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As the first step to find the Type B restricted equilibrium solution, we want to 
express a2{a\) in term of a\ and other parametric constant of the negotiation model 
such that the seller's expected payoff is the greatest. When the seller agent is in the 
information set/(ai) and need to provide a second offer ai to the buyer agent, he can 
then determine and propose the optimal second offer by using a2{a\) . The 
expression a2(ai) prescripts the optimal second offer, ai, such that {a\, ai) will be a 
Type B Combinations. 
3.8.3.2 Monotonicity of Seller's Second Round Payoff Function 
Now, we proceed to deduce the form ofa2(ai). In this section, we will first calculate 
the first derivative of the second round payoff function. We will then determine the 
optimal ai by this derivative. 
Lemma 3.12 The first derivative of the payoff function with respect to ai is given by 
(if i(a2) _ d\5a2' - Ibai + {a\ + Cs)b - Sa\Cs 
dm (Sai - hf 
where = a] - (1 - 5)1 
5{a2-cs){a2-a\) 5{a2-cs){ai-a\) 
Proof. Now, fAa i ) = — = — 
dai-ax + i}- 0)1 oai-b 
For fixed a\, b can be treated as a constant. • 
1 df i(a2) _ {dai -b)[a2 -Csai -a\\-5(ai 一Cs)(a2 -ci\) 
"'S dai - {Sai-bf 
—{dai — b)[2a2 - {a\ + Cs)] - [^<72' - (ai + Cs)a2 + a\Cs] 
— {5ai-hf 
—5ai - Ibai + {a\ + Cs)b - daiCs 
- {dai-bf 
1 df i(a2) __ Sai^ - lhai + {a\ + Cs)b - 6a\Cs 
"~5 dai — (dai-hf 
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which completes the proof. 
• 
When we examine the first derivative of f\{a2) with respect toai, we leam 
the following property. 
Lemma 3.13 The first derivative of f 1(^ 2) with respect to ai does not contain any 
points of discontinuity. 
Proof. We consider the denominator of 办丨严) 
dai 
5a2-h-da2-a\ + {\- 5)1 
<{l -a\)-d{l - a\) a\ > a^ 
= {l-ax){\-5) 
<0 (... 0<S <\and a\ > 1) 
\/a2 such that a\>a2, Sa2-b<0and there are no point of 




From Lemma 3.13, we learn that there is no point of discontinuity in , 
dai 
such that, at that particular value, the fiinction /1(^2) may attain a local maximum. 
Then, we shift our attention to the numerator of 丄则 “ �) a n d define the following 
5 dai 
function 
h{a) -da" - Iba + (ai + Cs)b — Sa\Cs. 
Clearly, this function has the same form as the numerator of 丄办� “ •) . The 
5 dai 
following Lemma shows that the equation h{a) - 0 always has distinct real roots. 
7 6 
Lemma 3.14 Ifai > / , the equation h{a) - 0 always has distinct real roots. If we let 
the two solutions of h{a) = Obe xand y such thatx: < 少，we have 
_ ai - (1 - 5)1 - yjil - S)(ai - l)[ai -{1-SI + Sc.)] ^^^ 
-
a i - ( l - S ) l + -7(1 - S){a^ - / ) [a i -{1-31 + 
产 S 
Proof. Now, A = 41)2 - 4 州 + Cs)b - da\Cs\ 
[(a\ + Cs)b - &i\Cs] = {a\ + Cs)[a\ - (1 - 5)1] - SaiCs 
= - (1 一 S)la] + Csa\ 一 (1 - S)lcs - Sa\Cs 
= — (1 _ S)/ai + (1-S)csai — (1 _ S)/cs 
= -{\-d)(l-Cs)ax-(\-5)lcs 
5[{ax + cs)b — Sa^cs] = Sai' — S(\ — S){1 — Cs)ai - S(l - 5)lcs 
...b^ - 5[{ax + cs)b — Saics] = (1 — 5)ax' - (1 — d){2l -汉 + 5cs)ax 
+ {\-5ff+d{\-d)lcs 
=(1 -5)[ai ' - ( 2 / - 5 1 + Scs)ai + (1 - d ) P + Slcs 
=(1 — d){a\ -l)[a\ -(J-SI + Scs)] 
a\-{I-SI + Scs) 
= a\-! + SI -Scs 
= {ax-l) + S(l-Cs) 
> 0 ( v a\>I) 
\'0<S<\ 
A of h{a)=办2 - J [ ( � + cs)b - Sa\Cs] > 0, and the equation 
h(a) = 0 always has distinct real roots. Since h(a) is simply a 
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quadratic function, we can easily find the root of h{a) = 0 by the 
quadratic formula. If we denote the roots as x and y such that x<>' , 
_ a i - ( l - S ) l - - S){ai - l)[ai-jl-SI + Sc^] ^^^ 
S 
a i - ( l - S ) l + J(1 - - / ) [a i -{1-SI + Scs)] 
y = 
少 S 
which completes the proof. 
• 
Since the function h(a) has distinct real roots if ai > / ’ the denominator of 
妒(“2) can be factorized into two linear terms. However, the function 办，)m a y 
dai dai 
not have zero(s). The value of xand 少may lie outside the possible range of aii.Q. 
I <a2<a\ when I <a\<h-d{h-l) or —~G 办 <a2<a\ 
o 
when h-d(h-I)<a\<h. Now, we want to show that x will be a zero of 办 i ^ ) only 
dai 
when I ^(\-6){l-CS)<a\<S2. For all other cases,办；⑷ is always 
2 dai 
negative and the second round payoff ftmction of the seller is monotonic decreasing. 
We will proof this result by comparing the value of x and y with the boundary values 
of ai, I.e. /, a\ and . 
S . 
Lemma 3.15 When the seller agent is using a Type B Combination such that 
I < a ^ < a ^ < h andc* < , 
_a^-{\-5)1 - V(1 - 5){ax - /)[ai-(/-^ + ^ 
x= ^ < � i 
Proof. We want to proof by contradiction. Supposes > a\, then 
ai - (1 - 3)1 - - 5){ai - l)[a\ -{1-51 + Scs)] > Sai 
V 
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...ai _ (1 — 5)1 -dai> - 5){ax - l)[ax-�l-Sl + Scs)] 
(1 - S)(ai-/)> ^(l-S)(ai-l)[ai-{l-SI + Scs)] 
(1 - S)(ai - If > (ax - l)[ax _ (/ —汉 + Scs)] 
(..• Terms on both sides > 0) 
(ai -/)[(!- -l)-ai + (I-SI + Scs)]> 0 
(V ai-l>0) 
a\-Cs<0 
which is clearly a contradiction. 
...x <a\ which completes our proof. 
• 
We then pinpoint the relationship between y and a\. 
Lemma 3.16 When the seller agent is using a Type B Combination such that 
I < a ^ < a ^ < h and c* < , 
ai — (1 — 5)1 + J(1 - 5){ax - l)[ax 一 (J-S/ + Scs)] 
V = > 
, J 
Proof. We want to proof by contradiction. Suppose j < ai , then 
"1 - (1 - S)/ + - - /)[«! - ( / - S / + fc)] < 彻 1 
o ( l - S ) a x _ (1 - S)l + 7(1 - d)iai - I)[ai-(I-SI + Scs)] < 0 
o (1 - S)(ai - l ) + ^(1 - S){ai - l)[ai -{1-SI + Scs)] < 0 
Since a \> I and A > 0, the above expression have contradiction. 
.•• y > a \ which completes our proof. 
• 
There is an important implication in Lemma 3.16. Referring to the result of 
Lemma 3.6, we know that the value of ai must be less thana\ when the seller agent is 
using a Type B Combination. Since >ai in general, y is not a zero to the function 
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� and not a potential candidate second offer which will be prescribed by the 
dai 
Type B restricted equilibrium solution. Combining the results in Lemma 3.15 and 
, , . ^ df 1(<32). 
Lemma 3.16, we learn that x<a \ andy>a \ . Because the denominator ot -——is 
da 2 
always greater than zero and its nominator is a concave quadratic function, we should 
have the following interesting insight. Starting at some specific value of ai，the 
second round payoff must be strictly decreasing when ai approaches the upper bound, 
a\. Now, we want to state the relationship between x and I. 
Lemma 3.17 When / < a i< / + (1 - -Cs), x<I. Otherwise, x>l. 
Proof. Suppose now, x>l, then 
a i - ( l - S ) l - ^(1 - S)(ai — / ) [a i -{1-SI + Scs)] > SI 
o ai - / > V(1 - - l)[a\ -(1-51 + Scs)] 
o (ai - I f - ( 1 -S){a i -/)[ai-{I-a + Scs)] > 0 
o (ai-1){a\-l-{\-5)[ax-(J-51 + &.)]} > 0 
<=> {ax - /)恤-/ + (1 - 5)1 - 3(1 - 5)1 + S(\ - S)cs} > 0 
o (ai - /){彻】-251 + 5^1 + 3{\ - S)cs} > 0 
0 S(ai - /)lai-2/ + S/ + (l-S)cs] > 0 
oa\<l (rejected) or ai > / + (1 - 5){1 - Cs) 
.. .When / < a i< / + (1 - S){1 -Cs) , x<I . On the other hand, when 
1 + (\-S){l-Cs)<a^<h , x>I. • 
• 
The above Lemma shows the relationship between x and I under different 
range of a\ . In the previous section, we know that the lower bound of ai is 
/when / <a\ <h-S(h-l). By determining the relationship between xand/, we can 
analyze, in the case when I <a\ < h - S { h - l ) , whether aican take the value of xand 
attain a local maximum of the payoff function. 
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On the other hand, as。丨 ^^ ^ 印 may also be a lower bound 
oiai when h-5{h-l)<a\<h, we also need to consider the relation between x 
a n d — - ~ ~ ^ ^ . The following Lemma is thus provided. 
5 
Lemma 3.18 We define the following quantity 
21 — 3(1 - Cs) + JS^ (/ - csf + 4(1 - S)(h - If 
Si  
2 
which is greater than I. 
I f / < a i < 5 2 , x > —. On the other hand, if ai > 52, x < . 
5 5 
Proof. X > — 
。 ^ > S 
o ai - (1 - S)l - - S){ai - / ) [a i -{1-SI + Scs)] > ai - (1 - S)h 
o (1 -S){h-/)> -S)(ai — l)[ax-(1-31 + Scs)] 
~ 0(1-Sy{h-If >(1 - - ( 2 1 - S I + Scs)m + (1 - + Slcs 
(..• Both sides have positive sign.) 
0 ( 1 - — 2/z/ + / 2 ) > — (21-SI + Scs)ai + (1 - + Slcs 
o - ( 2 / - 5 1 + Scs)ai - (1 - + 2(1 - S ) h l + Slcs < 0 
We let g{ai) = -{21-51 + - ( 1 — + 2(1 - S ) h l + Slcs 
...A of g(m) = i2l-a + Scsf - 4[—(1 — + 2(1 — S)hl + Slcs] 
=4/2 + S"-!^ + SW - 4(5/2 - IS^lcs + 45Ics + 4(1 - S)h' 
-S(\-S)hl-4Slcs 
=S^iP - llcs + + 4(1 — 5 y - 8(1 - d)hl + 4(1 - 5)f 




A of > 0 
.•. The equation of g{a\) 二 0 always has solutions. 
We now change the variable a\ into another unconstrained variable 
a and denote the roots of g{a) = 0 as 5i and si. Without loss of 
generality, we assume < 52. Then, 
21 - d{l — c.) — (/ - csf + 4(1 - S){h - If ^ 
s\ 二 and 
2 
21 - d(l - Cs) + Jd^ (/ - Csf + 4(1 - 6){h - I f 
S2 = 2 
••. — {21 -51 + dcs)m _ (1 — + 2(1 — 5)hl + 5lcs < 0 
<=> (ai - -52) <0 
<=> 5i< a i< 52 
...If 5i< ai < 52, X > — ~ - ~ ^ ^ . On the other hand, if a\ < s\ or 
J 
a\ > S2, X < —. 
d 
However, we can show that 51 < I. Now, 





</ (••• d{1-Cs)>Q>) 
V 
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Because 51 < / , a\>l> s\ i.e. a\ will never be less than 51. 
••. X < — when a\ > si and, > — when 
1 < a\ < S2 which complete the proof. 
• 
Lemma 3.17 and 3.18 are very important in reviewing the value o^al that 
should be prescribed by the Type B restricted equilibrium solution. When the seller 
agent chooses to use a Type B Combination and is in different Information Set/(ai)at 
the second round of the negotiation, the value of x may or may not be greater than 
the lower bound of a\. When the value of xis greater than the lower bound of ai, it 
can be considered as a candidate second offer prescribed by Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution. On the reverse case, the payoff function will be a monotonically 
decreasing function of ai and its lower bound should be the prescribed second offer. 
In the following section, we will try to find the optimal second offer of the 
seller when / > " + � . 
2 
// + Cs 
3.8.3.3 Second Offer Prescribed by Equilibrium Strategy when / > ~ - ~ 
” When / > ~ ， w e want to show that the prescribed offer of the seller in the second 
round of the negotiation should be given by / i f there exists a Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution {a\, ai) . At the same time, we will show that • a Type B 
combination (ai, ai) wih a\ within a particular interval [h-5{h-l), h) is less 
favorable than other types of restricted equilibrium solution when the buyer agent is 
using his equilibrium strategy. 
In order to prove this result, we will first divide the range of possible value of 
a\ into different interval and determine the property of 办(。：) We can then 
dai 
determine the second offer that should be prescribed by Type B restricted equilibrium 
solution, if any, by examining the property of 办《叫. 
dai 
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Lemma 3.19 I f S 2 < h - 5 { h - l ) < U { \ - d ) { l - C s ) . 
2 
Proof. Clearly, 2h - 2S(h — /) - 2/ + S(l - Cs) 
= 2ih-l)-2S{h-l) + 3(l-Cs) 
= 2{\-S)ih-l) + SiI-Cs) 
>0 
2h-25(h-l)-2l + S{l-Cs)f 
= [2{\-S){h-l) + Sil-Cs)f 
= 4 ( 1 - S)\h - I f + 4S{1 - S)(h - /)(/ - Cs) + S\l - Csf 
> 4(1 - Sf {h — If + 4S{\ - d){h - If csf 
(\'l-cs>h-l) 
=4(1 - -S + S]{h — If +S\I- Csf 
= 4 { \ - S ) ( h - l f + S \ l - c s y 
>0 
2h - 2d{h - /) - 2/ + 5{l - > 4(1 - S){h - if Csf > 0 
， 2/7 — 2d(h-0-2/ + 5(1 — a) > ^ 4(1 - - i f +d\l-Csf 
.\h-d(h-l)>Ss 
N o w , h-5{h-l)-[U{\-5)(l-Cs)\ 
= {\-d)(h-l)-{\-d)(l-Cs) 
^ , , h + Cs \ 
< 0 (•.. I > ) 
2 
.•• h - 5 { h - l ) < l + {\-d)(l-Cs) 
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(Note: h-5{h-l)>l + {\-d){l-Cs)) 
Combining the two results, we will have 
/? + Cs 
Ss<h- 5{h -/)</ + (!- 5){l - Cs) when / > , which complete the 
proof. 
• 
From Lemma 3.15 onward, we have spent quite a lot of time in proofing the 
relation between x and the boundary values ofai. Our intention is to find out whether 
the second round payoff function is monotonic decreasing after a specific value ofai. 
If the payoff function is monotonically decreasing, an increase in monetary reward of 
an actualized deal cannot compensate the decrease in the probability of making a deal. 
The seller agent will then provide the lowest possible offer to the buyer agent. In the 
following theorem, we will summarize the optimal second offer of the seller agent 
when a\ is within different ranges of value and / > - ~ . 
/? + Cs 
Lemma 3.20a For / > ~ t h e second offer of the seller agent prescribed by the 
Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) is specified as follow. 
i. If/ <a\ <h-S{h-l), the optimal value of ai should be/ . 
ii. If h-S(h-l) <a\<h, no ai can be optimal (i.e. when the seller agent is 
using a Type B Combination, he will get a less favorable payoff than using 
strategy(ies) in other types of strategic combination.). 
Proof. From Lemma 3.6, we know that 
i. \{l<a\<h- S(h-/), I <a2<a\. 
ii. If / ? - 5 { h - l ) < a \ < h , —-~^^<a2<a\ 
5 
We first consider the case when (1 — d)(l - C s ) < h - l such 
X\vdiXl + {\-d){l-Cs)<h. " 
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Then, by Lemma 3.18 and 3.19, we have 
sx<l<S2<h-d{h-l)<l + {\-d){l-Cs)<h 
For I <a\<S2 , — - ^ ^ < x < l . Therefore, the fiinction 
5 
妒 ( � 2) < 0 ioxl<a2<a\. The ftinction f 1(^2)is strictly decreasing on 
dai 
the interval I <a2<a\. 
...The second offer of the seller agent prescribed by the Type B 
restricted equilibrium solution (if any) should be/ i.e. ai-l. 
For S2<a\ <h-d{h-l), x<l< —~-^^. Therefore, the fiinction 
5 
办恤)< 0 for / < < ai . The ftinction /1(^2) is strictly decreasing on 
dai 
the interval I <a2<a\. 
...The optimal second offer of the seller agent prescribed by the Type 
B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) should be / i.e. cn = l . 
¥ovh-Sih-l)<ai<l + {\-S)(l-CS), 雄 Therefore, 
S 
the function 妒 (仍 ) < 0 for — - ^ ^ < cn < a\ . The fiinction 
c/ai 5 
f 1(^2) is strictly decreasing in the interval — ~ — ~ ^ ^ < a i < a \ . 
5 
Clearly, the payoff will be greatest when the value of ai approach the 
lower bound — ~ - ~ ^ ^ . 
We note that when ai approaches and attains the value, — ~ - ~ ^ ^ , 
5 
the seller's strategic combination will chafige from a Type B 
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Combination in the form of ai, — ( 1 約 " + s \ where s： -> 0, to a 
K o J 
Type A Combination in the form of ai, — ~ - ^ ^ where 
V ^ 
h-S(h-l)<a\<l + {l-S)(l-Cs) . As the (first round expected) 
rr r • „ . . f ax-{\-5)h ) payoff function or the seller is continuous, ai, h s , 
\ o J 
where s should be less favorable when compared with 
a\, —~-^^ and the buyer agent is using his equilibrium strategy, 
V 3 
which is in turn less optimal than a Type A Combination in the form of 
(/?, ai) (proofed in Lemma 3.5). Therefore, we need not 
consider — ~ - ~ + s, when h-d{h-1) < a\ <l + {\ -d){l-Cs), as 
5 
a candidate of optimal second offers. 
...It is not optimal for the seller to use a Type B Combination in this 
case. 
For / + , / � y� — (！―印 . T h e r e f o r e , the 
5 
^ . df \{ai) ^ _ a\-{\- S)h „ . „ . . . 
function < 0 for — < cn < a\ The mnction /1(^2) is 
dai S 
strictly decreasing in the interval —~^^^ �< a 2 < a \ . 
By the same arguments presented in the case when 
h-S{h-l)<a.<l + (\-S)(I-Cs)^ it is not optimal for the seller 
agent to use a Type B Combination when. ^ + (1 一 約 - C s ) < a x < h 
Then, we consider the case when (1 - 5){l - C s ) > h - l such that 
(\-5){l-Cs)>h-l. 
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By Lemma 3.13 and 3.14, we have 
sx<l<S2<h-5{h-l)<h<l + i\-d){l-Cs) 
The situation when I <a\<si ?indiS2<a\<h-5{h-l) is similar to the 
case when(1 - 5 ) { l - C s ) < h - l . 
Vox h-5{h-1) <ai<h, x<l< � - 印 Therefore, the function 
5 
# 2 ) < 0 . The payoff function /丨(a2) is 
dai S 
. , � . L . , ax-{\-5)h 
strictly decreasing on the interval <a2<a\. o 
From the same argument as presented in the case when 
( l - J ) ( / - c . ) < / ? - / a n d h - 5 ( h - l ) < a ^ < U { \ - ^ ) { l - C s ) ^ it is not 
optimal for the seller to use a Type B Combination. 
Combining the case when (1 - S){1 -Cs)<h-l and (1 - 5){l -Cs)>h-l, 
we will have the results of Lemma 3.20a. 
• 
Lemma 3.20a is, so far, the most important Lemma that we have come across 
and its physical interpretation can be comprehended as follow. The value 
I-Cs denotes the difference between the seller's private valuation and the lowest 
possible value of buyer's private valuation. On the other hand, the value h -1 denotes 
the difference between the highest and lowest possible private valuation of the buyer. 
Lemma 3.20a reviews a principle in choosinga^. When the disparity between buyer's 
and seller's valuation is great ( / -Cs > / ? - / ) , the seller could adopt a less aggressive 
strategy such that the value of a\ can be in the range [l,h-5{h- /)) and the second 
offer a^ should take the value I or, otherwise, the seller should not use a Type B 
Combination. 
/? + Cs 
3.8.3.4 Second offer Prescribed by Equilibrium Strategy when / < 
2 
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After we have considered the case when the disparity between buyer's and seller's 
valuation is great, we will discuss the opposite case w h e n / < / ? - / . In this case, 
we can show that the second offera2 prescribed by the seller agent's Equilibrium 
strategy should be given by either I when I <ai<I+ (\-S)(l-Cs) or 
a i - ( W ) / - V ( l - ^ i - / ) [ “ � - ( / - ^ + M w h e n / + ( W ) ( / - c O s “ i < & . A t t h e 
d 
same time, we will show that there does not exist a Type B restricted equilibrium 
solution (flfi, ai) such that a\ is within the interval [h-d{h- /), h). 
/? + Os 
Now, we will derive some inequality relations as in the case of I > ~ — before 
we proceed to derive the second offers that should be prescribed by Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution. 
Lemma 3.21 I f t h e n S2>h-d{h-l)>U{\-5){l-Cs). 
2 
/? + Cs 
Proof. I f / < - , then l - C s < h - I . 
2 
N o w , Ih-25{h-/)-2/ + 5(1 — Cs) = 2(1 一 5 ) { h - / ) + 5{l-c.)>0 
[2h 一 25{h _ /) _ 2/ + 5{l — Cs)f 
= 2 ( \ - S ) ( h - l ) + S{l-Cs)f 
=4(1 I f + 5 \ l - Csf + A5(\ - 5){h — /)(/ - Cs) 
< 4(1 — 5f{h - If +S\l- Csf + 4^(1 — 5){h — if 
( \ ' l - c s < h - l ) 
=4(1 一 S)[\-S + Slh-If +S\l- Csf 
= 4 { \ - S ) { h - l f + S \ l - C s f 
0 < 2/7 - 2S{h -I)-21 + S{I - Cs) < ^ 4(1 - S)(h-if +S\l - Csf 
8 9 
. , … ， 、 2 / - 5{1 - Cs) + ^ 4(1 - S)(h - I f +S\l- Csf _ 
I.e. h - o { h - l ) < SI 
S2>h-d(h-l) 





>0 (v /7 -2 / + C.>0) 
••. h - 5 ( h - l ) > l + {\-5){l-Cs) 
Combining these results, we have 
HJ I P 
^ 2 > / 7 - ^ ( / / - / ) > / + ( l -^^)( / -c . )when / < — — 
• 
Although we have clarified the lower bound ofsi，its value may be greater 
than h . However, we will eliminate this possibility by the following Lemma. 
Lemma 3.22 In general, si<h. 
21 一 3(1 - Cs) + JS' (/ - + 4(1 - S)(h - If 
Proof. 52 = 
2 
2 • 
21 - 5{l — Cs) + 如(! — Cs) + 2(h — l ) f 
< 2 





s i < h , which complete the proof. 
• 
The above Lemmas helps reviewing the relation between the three values: x , / 
and 以 一 炒 . A f t e r we have clarified the relation betweenx, I a n d �（！。办， 
5 ^ 
we can determine the monotonicity of second round payoff function, f\{ai). We will 
then propose the second offer that should be prescribed by the Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution suppose the value of a\ is lying in a particular range. 
When / the second offer that should be prescribed by the Type B restricted 
2 
equilibrium solution (if any) is summarized by the following Lemma. 
Lemma 3.20b the second offer of the seller agent prescribed by the 
2 
Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) is specified as follow. 
i. I f / < a i < / + ( l - (5)( / -Cs) , (22二 1. 
ii. I f / + (1 - 5){l - Cs) < a i < 52, a2 = x, where 
ai - ( 1 - S ) l — J(1 — S)(ai - / ) [ a i - { 1 - 5 1 + Scs)] 
X = 
iii. Ifs2<a\<h, no aiis optimal (i.e. the seller agent should not use a Type B 
Combination). 
Proof. From Lemma 3.6, we know that • 
i. \il<ax<h-5{h-l), l<ai<ax. 
•• Trw e/i , �y , a\-(\- S)h 
11. If h - d{h -1) < a\ < h, — < a2 < ai 
S 
By Lemma 3.21 and 3.22, we have 
s\<l <l + (\- S){1 -Cs)<h- 5{h -l)<S2<h 
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For l<m<h-5{h-l),以i_(l-约A<y�/ . Therefore, the 
0 
function 抓。之)< • ， • 们 such that I < ai < a\ . The second round 
dai 
payoff function /1(^2) is strictly decreasing for / <ai<a\. 
...The optimal second offer should be / i.e. ai-l. 
For l + {\-d){l-Cs)<a^<h-5{h-l) ， <l<x<ax . 
o 
Therefore, the function 炉(以？) = o when 
dai 
ai - (1 - 5)1 - J(1 — d){ax - /)[ai — (/ -汉 + Scs)] 
ai-x^ — 
and a2 = X is within the range of possible value [/, ai) . The payoff 
function should attain a local maximum when a2 = x . 
...The optimal second offer should be x i.e. ai-x. 
For h-5{h-l)<a\<S2 , I <a\ . Therefore the 
5 
function 妒(以�)：q when 
dm 
ai - (1 - (^)/-
ai-x- = 
J 
and = X is within the range of possible value i.e. — ~ ~ - a \ . 
V o 
The payoff function should attain a local maximum when a2 = x . 
...The optimal second offer should be 02 = x . 
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For S2<a^<h , . Therefore, the function 
6 
# 2 ) < o ， V 仍 such that �_ ( 1 — T h e second round 
dai S 
payoff function /i(a2) is strictly decreasing. 
As (first round expected) payoff function of the seller are continuous, 
f ai — (1 — ) 
the strategic combination a\, + s where £： -^O should 
\ 0 ) 
result in a less favorable payoff than a Type A Combination in the form 
f 以 1 —(i_ … � 
of ^——-J ’ which is in turn less favorable than a strategic 
combination in the form of {h,a2) with some specific value of ai, 
when the buyer agent is using his equilibrium strategy. 
f �—（1 _ ) 
...The Strategic combination a\, + s where £： ->0should 
V y 
not be a equilibrium strategy, when S2 < a\ < k, and the seller should 
not use a Type B Combination in this case. 
Combining the results when / + (1 - 5){l -Cs)<a\<h-d{h-l), 
h-5{h-l)<a\<S2 , I <a\<h-d{h-l) and S2<a\<h , we can 
obtain Proposition 3.20b. 
. • 
The above derivation illustrates the methods of finding an optimal second 
offer in term of a\ and other parametric value when a\ is within a particular range. As 
the ranges of a\ stated in Lemma 3.20a and 3.20b represent all possible values ofa i , 
the seller also knows the optimal value of a! under all possible cases of a\. 
As we have mentioned before, we can substitute the functional form of ai in 
term ofai and/or other parameters back into the first round expected payoff function. 
The payoff function will then be converted into a single variable function in term 
ofa i . By optimizing the single variable payoff function, we can find the value of a\ 
that should be prescribed by the Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) and 
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use this optimal value to recalculate ai. When we can obtain concrete values of 
aianda2 i.e. the restricted equilibrium solution of all three types, we can compare 
them and determine which one should be prescribed by the Sequential Equilibrium of 
our One-to-One negotiation model. 
3.8.3.5. Optimization of payoff in the First Round Negotiation 
In the previous section, we have expressed the second offer ai that should be 
prescribed by the Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) in term of the first 
offer flfi and/or other parameters. In this section, we will substitute the expression of 
ai back into the first round payoff function and solve for the value ofai prescribed by 
the Type B restricted Equilibrium solution. After the value of a\ has been calculated, 
the corresponding value of ai will then be derived by Lemma3.20a and Lemma 2.20b. 
As we have artificially separate in value of a\ into different range and find the 
corresponding value of ai, the optimization of the first round payoff ftinction should 
also be subjected to a particular range of a\ • After we have find the strategic 
combinations in all possible range of ai, we can compare the payoff of these strategic 
combinations with one another and choose to use the one which results in the highest 
payoff. The following tables provide a summary of the candidate Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution. The candidate Type B restricted equilibrium solution for the 
/? + C^s 
seller when I > is given in Table 3.3. 
2 
Range of a\ Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) 
I <a\<h All Type B combination are dominated by Type C 
Restricted equilibrium solution 
/? Cs 
Table 3.3 Type B restricted equilibrium solution when / > ~ 
On the other hand, the candidate Type B restricted equilibrium solution for the 
/? + Cs 
seller agent when I < -——-is given in Table 3.4. ^ 
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Range of a\ Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) 
/ < ai < / + (1 — 5\l -Cs) h + 3c. > 4/ no solution 
I 2 ‘ J 
/ + (1 - - Cs) <ai<Ss i. the first offer ai prescribed by the Type B 
restricted equilibrium solution are real roots of the 
equations 
16S 16(5 16J 
possible) and the corresponding value of ai should 
be given by 
a i - ( l - ( ^ ) / - J(1 - - / ) [ a i - ( / —汉 + &.)] 
, 2 = ^  
ii. When the payoff is optimal when 
ai = / + (l-(^)(/-Cx) , it is the solution when 
/?-h3cs> 4/ and the corresponding value of 
cn should be given by 
a i - ( l - 5 ) 1 - J(1 — 5){ax - /)[ai 一 (J — SU Scs)]  ^  
However, when h + 3cs<4l, no solution in this 
case. 
iii. When the payoff is optimal when a\ tend to 52, no 
solution. 
S2<A\<H no solution 
21 一 — Cs) + JS^ ( / - csf + 4(1 - S){h - If 
Note: 52 = 
2 
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伦=(漁 + 4/ — 3(57 + 2dcs){5h +12/ -11汉 + \OScs) 
B3 二 -(/ -Sl + Scs)(Sh + 41-3Sl + Idcsf 
C x ^ - 2 A { \ - 5 ) { 2 l - a + dcs) 
Ci = 3(1 — 5){Al-3(57 + 3dcs){Aldcs) 
/? + Cs 
Table 3.4 Type B restricted equilibrium solution when / < — ^ 
After we have summarized all Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any), 
we will illustrate the process on how we derive these solutions. We will first deal with 
, , , h + Cs 
the case when I > . 
2 
/? + Cs 
3.8.3.5.1 Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution when I > ^ ‘ 
As the first step to solve for the Type B restricted equilibrium solution (ai, ai), we are 
going to substitute the expression ai which were obtained from Lemma 3.20a back 
into the first round expected payoff function of the seller. As stated in the previous 
sections, the expected payoff function of the seller in the first round of the negotiation, 
when the seller is using Type B Combinations, should be given by 
f (ai, ai) = {a\ - Cs) p{cB)dcB + 5{a2- c^) p{cB)dcB . 
ic* Ja2 
Because the threshold valuation ci is given by max{c * (ai, ai), a\], c\ should take the 
value of c * as c* > a\ when the seller agent is using Type B Combination. Since c * 
is a function of a\ as well as ai and we have the expression of ai which may be 
assigned the value /or expressed in term ofa i , the function / ( a i , ai) can be reduced 
to a single variable function in term of a]. 
Now, by Proposition 3.20a, we have the following relation between a\ and ai 
i. If I <a\<h-d{h-l) second offer ai should be assigned a value such 
thata2 = I . 
V 
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ii. I f / / - 5 { h - l ) < a \ < h , t h e seller should not use an aisuch that the strategy 
combination (ai, a2)is in the set of Type B Combination because it cannot 
be an equilibrium strategy. 
From the results as shown above, we can derive Proposition 3.6a. 
H% I P 
Proposition 3.6a For / > — t h e seller should not use a Type B Combimtiofi 
because it cannot be an equilibrium strategy. 
Proof. As revealed by Lemma 20a, we need not consider any Type B 
Combinations (ai,ai)such that h-d{h-l)<a\<hdiS they should not 
be the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent. 
h + Cs 
We then consider the case when I > a n d / < a \ < h - S ( h - l ) .V^Q 
2 
know that, in this case, the value of ai prescribed by the Type B 
restricted equilibrium solution (if any) should take the value of I. 
办 a\-Sa2 a\ - 51 
• 二 — 
“ 一 一 \ - s 
•.. The buyer's private valuation has a uniform distribution over the 
interval (/, h). 
...The p.d.f. on the random variable cb is given by 
脉 ] ^ 
The objective function for the seller in the first round of the negotiation 
will become 
/(ai, ai) = f{ax, I) 
^ a,-SI 
=(ai-Cs) J p { c B ) d c B i — p { c B ) d c B 
f ai— 汉 ） (a\-SI ) 
{a\ -c^) h 5(1-Cs) 1 _ \ J , U - ^ J 
h-l "h-l 
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{ai-cs)[{\-5)h + 5l-a\] 5(l-Cs)[a\-5l-{\-5)l 
= {\-d){h-l) + {\-d)(h-l) 
…，、(ai — c.)[(l-5)h + a-aA+d{l-Csjai-5l-{\-3)l] 
,(叫丨、 il-S)(h-l) 
. d f ( m , /) { l - S ) h + a-ai-ai + Cs + S{1 - Cs) 
“ d a i ( l - ( ^ ) ( / 7 - / ) 
_{\-S)h + 2^ + Cs-Scs-2ai 
= {\-S){h-I) 
• dfjm, /)_(!- S){h + Cs) + 251 - 2ai 
dm {\-5){h-l) 
Now, we let Q{x) to be the following function 
0(x) = (\~d){h + cs) + 2a-2x 
Now, m m + 汉 ^ _ 仲+a (VI > 
2 2 
<a\ 
••• Vai such that I <a\<h-S{h-l), Q(a\) < 0. 
.•. The funct ion,圳⑶,• < 0 . The first round objective function 
da\ 
f (ai, /) is strictly decreasing within the range I <a\<h- 5{h-1), 
and when the seller is using the corresponding optimal second 
offer ai-l. 
However, as the first round expected payoff function of the seller is 
continuous and the Type B Combination is in the form (/ + a, I) where 
9 8 
a 0 , this strategic combination should be less optimal than the 
Type C Combination (/, /) or (/, ai)，where l<a2<h. 
. . .Combining with the case when I <a\<h-5{h-l) and 
h-5{h-l)<a\<h, we know that the seller should use a Type B 
/? Cs . 
Combination when / > as it can never be an equilibrium 
2 
strategy, which complete our proof of Proposition 3.6a. 
• 
, ,h^-Cs 
After we have completed the two different cases when I > ^ , we will 
/? + Cs 
handle the case where I < . 
2 
3.8.3.5.2 Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution when / < 
From Lemma 3.20b, the value of ai should have different expression 
when the first offer ai lies within different range of value. The situation can be 
summarized as follow: 
i. I f / < a i < / + ( l - ^ ) ( / - c . ) , a2 = l. 
ii. I f / + ( l - ( ^ ) ( / - c . ) < a i < 5 2 , 
a i - (1 - J ) / - J (I - S)(ai - / ) [a i -(1-S/ + Scs)] 
a2 = x =  
iii. If S2<a\<h, the seller should not use an en such that the strategy 
combination {a\, ai) is in the set of Type B Combination. 
where the value of si should be given by 
2/ - 5(1 - Cs) + (/ - Csf + 4(1 -
2 . 
Now, we will proceed to solve this problem in a case by case basis. 
9 9 
Proposition 3.6b and /<a i< / + ( l - W - c . ) , the candidate Type B 
restricted equilibrium solution for the seller should be given as follow: 
i. When/7 + 3c .>4/ , the seller should not use Type B Combination as they 
cannot be equilibrium strategy. 
ii. When/z +3c. <4 / , a possible Type B restricted equilibrium solution can be 
I 2 J 
Proof. From Lemma 3.20b, we know that when / < ai < / + (1 - S)(l - Cs) and 
, / l + Cs 
I < , ai-l. 
2 
* a\-5ai a\ - 51 
• Q 二 — 
. . “ \ - 5 “ \-5 
The objective function of the seller becomes 
, a\- 51 a\-Sl J 
/(ai, ci2) = (ai - Cs) + - Cs) 1 -/ 
h-l h-l 
=(a\ — +S(I- Cs)  
_(ai-c.)[{\-5)h + a-ax\ 5{l-Cs)[ai-i 
二 (\-5){h-l) + (H)(/7-/) 
Because the function f {a\, ai) depends on a\ only, we may write 
( a i - c . ) [ ( l - 5 ) h + fli] I S(/-c.)(ai-/) 
(if (ai) — {[ - 5)h ^ 8 - a\- a\ + Cs^ 5{l - Cs) 
• dm — {\-S)(h-I) 
_ (l-S)h + {\-S)cs + 2a-2a^ 
= il-S){h-l) 
df(ai) _ (1 - S)ih + Cs) + 2a- lax  
dai — /) “ 
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We let R(x)hQ a function such that 
R{x) = ( 1 - S ) ( h + Cs) + 251 - Ix 
Clearly, when x = ( 1 - 力 广 0 + a, R{x) = 0. 
We then compare the value of 一 办 +〔力 + 汉 with boundary values 
of a\ 
2 
f h + cs 
>{\-6)l + 5l V-—>/ 
\ ^ J 
=1 
When we need to compare the value of 
(1 - S ) ( h + ^ ^ with/ + (1-S){1 -Cs), we subdivide the situation into 
two possible cases. 
Case (i) when h + 3c's > 4/ 
,1 h + Cs , , ) 
=(1 - J ) 1 - I + Cs . 
V 2 y 
, , J h^Cs-Al^lcs^ 
:(1 —約 
K ^ J 




Then, + + We can also say 
2t 
that the function R{ai) = (\- 3){h + Cs) + 2(5/ - 2ai > 0 , Vai such that 
I <a^<l + i\-S)(l-Cs). 
Therefore, the payoff function of the seller is strictly increasing in the 
interval / < a i< / + (1 - S)(l - Cs) 
：.It will be more optimal when the value of a\ approach its upper 
bound, i.e. / + ( ! - S)(I - Cs). 
However, as the expected payoff function of the seller should be 
continuous, the strategic combination (/ + (1 - S)(l - Cs) - a, /) where 
a 0 should be less optimal than the Type B 
combination (/ + ( / - S)(l - Cs), I). 
. . .Whenh + 36*. > 4 / , a Type B Combination (a\, ai) such that the value 
a\ will lie within the open interval (/, / + (1 - - c.)) should not be 
an equilibrium strategy. 
Case (ii) when h + 3cs< 4/ 
_{\-S){h + 3cs-4l) . 
— 2 
<0 
. . . / < ( H ) 广 + c 5 y < / + ( " ) “ ) . 
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Whenai = (1 — 柳 + + 51, the value of the function ^ ^ is equal 
to zero. The fiinction f{a\) attains a maximum. 
Now, we want to proof these values of a\ and ai belong to a Type B 
Combination. 
c* = = > a\ 
2 
, ((\-5){h + Cs) „ , � 
. . .For /? + 3c. > 4 / , the Strategic combination + ol, I 
V 2 y 
should be the equilibrium strategy which completes the proof. 
• 
As we mentioned in Lemma 3.20b, there are three possible regions of a^  that 
we need to consider when we want to express the second offer a � in term of some 
constant value and the value of ai. At the same time, we have shown that, when 
a\ lies within the range of (/?, 52), the seller should use a Type B Combination as it will 
never be the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent. The final case that we need to 
consider for finding the candidate Type B restricted equilibrium solution should be 
the case when / + (1 - S){1 - Cs) <a\<S2 . In the following proposition, we will try to 
derive that the Type B restricted equilibrium solution (if any) should have its a\ being 
a solution of cubic equation or taking the boundary / + (1 — S)(l - Cs) and ai-x. 
/? + Cs 
Proposition 3.6c When I < and / + (1 - S){I - Cs) <a\<Ss , the Type B 
2 
restricted equilibrium solution {a\, ai) should be such that the first offer, a\, is either 
a real root (if any) of the equation 
16(5 \65 \65 
where =-%{5h + 61 - 551 + Adcs) 
= 泳+ 41-3SI + 2Scs)iSh + \2l-na + \OScs) 
B3 = - ( / - S l + Scs){Sh + 4/ — W + 15csf 
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Ci = -2A{\-5){2l-a + dcs) 
Ci = 3(1 - 5){Al - ^51 + 3&.)(4/-Sl + Scs) 
C3 = -{\-S)l{4l-3Sl + 3Scsy 
if that root is within the range [/ + ( ! - S ) { 1 - Cs), 52). Or, the first offer may be at the 
boundaries i.e. / + ( 1 - w h e n /? + 3c.>4/ such that the strategic combination 
is given by(/ + ( l - ^ ) ( / - c . ) , /) . In all cases when the Type B restricted equilibrium 
solution exists, the optimal second offer should be given by the following expression 
ai - (1 - S)I - J{\ - S)iai - l)[m -{1-5U Scs)] 
.2 = ^ 
Proof. From lemma 3.20b, we know that when / + (1 - S)(I - Cs) <a\<Ss, 
a丨-(1 - S ) l - J{\-S)(ai - / ) [ a i - { 1 - S I + Scs)] 
a 广 ^  
出 a\-Sa2 • / ^ 不 一 
. . C 一 
_ai-ai + (\-S)I + ^(1 - S){ai — I)[ai-{1-SI + Scs)] 
= r ^ 
—(1 - S ) l + -7(1 -3) {a i -l)[a^-{l-SI + Sc^ 
- r ^ 
Now, we let h = ai-{\-S)l and A = (1 - S)ia\ - l)[a\ -{1-SI + Scs)], 
then 
h - y f l . 木 /丄• 
a2 = and c* = / + 
5 \-d 
1 , v i 
— 1 — — (21 -a + dcs)ax + ( 1 - 5)1^ + acs\^[2ai-(2!-汉 + Scs)] 
da\ S 
1 {\-S)[2ai-{2l-Sl + Scs)] 
W a 似 
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When we let a function A(ai) such that A(a\) = 2a\ -{21-SI + Scs), 
then 
dai _ 1 (l-5)A{ai) 
da\ 5 2(5 Va 
1 , 11 
dc* - ( 2 / - 5 1 + Scs)ai + (1 — + acs\ 2 [2a i - (2 / -S l + Scs)] 
一 _ 2  
一 2-n/A 
The objective function of the seller in the first round of the negotiation is 
given by 
/? — c * c * —^z) 
/ O i , ai) 二 ( a i — Cs)-—- + d(a2 — Cs) " 
h-l n-l 
dfjax, ai) h-c"" (a\-Cs) dc* ^ S(c*-cn) dai ( 
da\ h-l h-l da\ h-l da\ 
(^((22-c 朴 t/c* dai 
h-l L 彻 da\ _ 
_/? —c* �5(a2_Cs) a\-Cs dc* 
—h-l +!_ h-l h-! \ckn 
^ c*-a2 <32-Ci dai 
[h-l h-l J ckh 
(if�c^ a ) 
Now, we will consider each component of ——in turn 
c/a\ -
h — l - 1 
/?一c* _ 





/? —c* 1 {ax-l)[ax-{l-dUdcs)\ “ 
..h-i - �h-iyfK 
S{a2-Cs) a\-Cs 论 * 
h-l h-l\da\ 
_ - fe - ai + (1 _ S)cs] A(a\) 
__ h^l J2VA 
— a i - ( l - f ^ ) / - V A - a i + ( l - 5 ) c s 1 A{a\) 
~ J 2Va 
_ {\-5){l-Cs)A{a^) Ajax) 
_ 2(/7-/)VA 2{h-l) 
.“5{a2 - Cs) ai - 叫 t/c * 二（1 - 5){l - Cs)A{ax) A{ax) 
h-l / T T j ^ " 2 ( / 7 - / ) V a ^  2{h-l) 
J"c*—a2 a2-ci\da2 
o  
h-l h-l \ 
\ Va b - ^ f X b - j K 1 
_ J 口 — ~ ^ ^ ~ 一 ‘ ‘ n ( 1 - 脚 0 
— h-l h-l L^ _ 
1「， V X 2 Z ? - 2 V A ] r {\-S)A(m)' 
= I+ Cs + 1 T=  
h-l \-S 5 L 2Va _ 
_ 1 \5UScs-2m + 2{\-d)l 
一 口 ~ 5 + S { \ - S ) J • 
_ 2VA _ 
_ 1 l2I-a + Scs-2ai (2-^)VAlr {\-d)A{ai) 
- 口 L d + s{i-s) jL iTK^_ 
一 丄 _ ^ ( f l i ) l r 一 (\-s)A(aiy 
— 1 U l - S ) ^ (2-S)A{ai) A{ai) ^ 
- 外 1 - ^ + isiK 
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J c * ^ — a ^ s l dai 1 [ 2(2 — 5){a\ - l)[ax-(J-S1 + Scs)] + (1 - 
“|_ h-l h — l 
{A-6)A{ax) 
^ . 
, 1 ^ df (ai, ai). 
From the derivation as shown above, the non - j = t e r m ot is 
VA da\ 
given by 
Non —j= term = 1 — — -
Va 2(/7-/) ld{h-l) 
_ 1 AAjax) 
—~ 25{h-l) 
二 1 2A{a^) 
— S ( h - 1 ) 
1 term - ( � -Z ) [ “ i - (Z -汉 + (1 - S)(l - Cs)A{a^) 
7 a erm — ( h - l ) ^ 2(/7-/)Va 
2 ( 2 - S ) { a i -/)[fli-{1-51 + Scs)\+ (1 - S ) [ A i a i ) f 
+ 2S(h-l)yfA 
_{4-2d-2S)(ai - l)[ai - (/ -汉 + Scs)] {\-5)A{a{){A{ax)-a+ Scs\ 
— 2Sih-l)ylA 2S{h-l)yfA 
(1 -S) \2{a^ -/)[ai-{1-SI + Scs)] A{a{){lai-2l) • 
—(/z-/)L s ^ Id _ 
_ (1 -8 ) { a i - / )["2(31 -2{l-a + dcs) + lax-21 + 汉 
_ ^ ^ { h - l ) ^ [ J J l _ 
( 1 - 5 ) { a i -l)\Aax _ 4/ + M -
二 {h-l)^|_ JJK _ 
_ (1 - d ) { a i - / ) ( 4 m - A U M - 3 f c ) 
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2A{ai) ^ (l-S)iai-l){4ai-4I + 3Sl-3Scs) “ 
. . d a x ^ _ ~ 5{h-l)^ 
We define the function G{x), XGR such that 
一 1 2A(x)丨（1 - m - /)(4x - 4/ + 3汉-3Scs) 
where 
A ' = ( l - 5){x 一 l)[x-(l-a + Scs) 
Now we set G(x) = 0, 
lAjx) 1 (1 - S)(x - / ) ( 4 j c 一 41+3 汉一 3Scs) 
5{h-l)~ — ~ : 
Ax-AU2a-2Scs-dh^5l _(\-5){x-l){Ax-Al + 2>a-^dcs) 
5{h-l) - S � h - _ 
{4x-ai-4l + 3 S I - = (1 — S)(x — /)(4x- 一 4/ + 3Sl - 3Scs) 
{4x-3i-4l + 3Sl — 2Scs)\x - l)[x-(1-SI + Scs)]= 
( 1 — S){x - -41 + 2>5l - 3Scsy 
( x - - { I - S I + Scs)]{4x-Sh-4I + 33l-IScsf -
(1 — d){x - /)(4jc - 4/ + W - 3 ( 5 b ) 2 q ……(*) 
Now, we consider the first term of (*) 
[ x - ( / - J / + Scs)]{4x-Sh-4l + 3a-Idcsf . 
= [x-(l-5U6cs)Y 
[16x2 - 8 (欲 + 4 / - 3汉 + 2Scs)x'41 -W + Idcsf ] 
=16x3 - [8 (况 + 4/ — 3汉 + 25cs) + 16(/-(57 + Scs)^ + 
[8(/-SI + Scs)(Sh + 4/ - 3汉 + 2Scs) + {Sh + 4I-3a + 2Scsf]x -
-{1-SI + Scs)(Sh + 41- 3S1 + IScsf 
= 1 6 ? — 聊 + 6/ - 5(57 + 4Scs)x^ +(Sh + 4/-3^ + 2Scs) * 
(Sh + 12/-l \dl + \OScs)x-(1-SI + SCS){3J + 4/ - 3(5/ + 2Scsf 
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Since the constant term, the coefficient of x , and are simply 
algebraic combination of h, / , Cs and S, we would like to use some 
notation for denoting these constants. We let 
Bi = -S(Sh + 6l-5SI + 4Scs) 
B2 = {Sh + 4l-3a + 2Scs)(Sh + \2l-\\a + \OScs) 
Bs = -(/-Sl + Scs)(Sh + 41-351 + IScsf 
:.[x-{l-Sl + S c s ) ] { 4 x + Idcsf =\6x'+ Bxx" + Bix + Bi 
We will then consider the second term of (*) 
(1 — S)(x - / ) (4x-4/ + 3^-S&sf 
二（1 - - / ) [ 1 6 x ' -8(4/-3(57 + 3^s)x + (4/-3(5/ + S ^ s f ] 
=(1 - (5)办 6x3 — [8(4/ - 3汉 + 3 么 )+ i 6 / y + 
(4/ - 3(57 + 3Scs){Sl + 41-331 + 3Scs)x -
I(4l-3a + 3Scsy} 
二 16(1 - - 24(1 - S){21 -51 + + 
3(1 - 5){Al-3a + 3Scs)(4l+ dcs)x -
{ \ - -351 + 35csf 
Since the constant term, the coefficient of x, x^ and x) are simply 
algebraic combination of h, /，Cs and 3, we would like to use some 
notation for denoting these constant. We let 
0 = -24(\-S)(2l-Sl + Scs) 
Ci = 3(1 - SX4/-W + 3&s)(4/-(5/ + 5cs) 
C3 = —(1 一 5)1{AI - 3Sl + 3Scsf 
. . .(1 一 S ) ( x — / ) (4x -4 / + 3 ^ - S ^ s f = 1 6 ( 1 - + C 1 X + C2X + C3 
¥ 
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. . .The condition R(x) = 0 can be reduced to x = l (rejected since 
a\ cannot be /) or 
1 eac'+(Bi - Ci)x'+(B2 - C2)x+(Bs - C3) = 0 
i.e. 
3 ( 5 l - C l ) 2 ( B 2 - C 2 ) ( B 3 - C 3 ) _ 战、 
m i6S 16S 
Because the constant term, the coefficients of , and x are all 
constant, there are well established method for solving (#) [18]. If we 
can find solution of (#) such that the solution is 
within + 52), this solution will make 却、,们)to be 
aa\ 
equal to zero. The corresponding second offer and there expected 
payoff can be derived and compared to deduce the Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution (if any). 
If all the roots of (#) are out of the range [/ + ( l -^)( / -C5), si) or the 
payoff function is strictly decreasing, the boundaries / + (1 - 5)(J - Cs) 
may be the first offer prescribed by the Type B restricted equilibrium 
solution. When + 3c5 > 4/, we know that, if / < ai < / + (1 - 5){l - Cs), 
the first round payoff function tends to maximum when ai tends to 
/ + (1 — S)(/-Cs) and the strategic combination tends to 
(/ + (1 - - Cs), I) However, in this range of 
/ + (1 - S)(l - Cs) <a\<Ss, we know that the payoff function will be a 
maximum when a\ is given by / + (1 - S)(I - Cs) and the strategic 
combination tends to (/ + (1 - S){1 - Cs), /) . Therefore, the strategic 
combination {l + {\-S)(l-Cs), I) should be a Type B restricted 
equilibrium solution. 
However, when the payoff fiinction is a maximum when ai tends to si, 
the strategic combination that a\ = s-s and the corresponding 
ai should result in a less favorable payoff than the strategic 
1 1 0 
combination ai 二 and the corresponding ai，as the payoff function is 
continuous. However, the seller agent should not use a Type B 
Combination in the range when S2<a\<h. There is no solution in this 
case when the payoff is maximized when a\ tends to si which 
completes our proof. 
• 
Now, we have completed all the analysis on the solution concept in our two 
stages negotiation. After we have examined the Type A, Type B and Type C restricted 
equilibrium solution of the seller agent, we can compare their expected payoff of the 
seller when the negotiation starts (i.e. using the first round expected payoff function) 
and determine which (ai, ai) can achieve a most favorable payoff. After we have 
found the concrete value of {a\, ai), we can use them, proposition 3.1 and proposition 
3.2 to recalculate the buyer's agent action prescribed by the equilibrium strategy of 
the buyer agent. This Strategic Combinations, together with the strategy of the buyer 
agent and belief of the seller agent on buyer's private valuation, will form a 
Sequential Equilibrium for our One-to-One two stage negotiation game. 
3.9 Numerical Example 
In this section, we will try to apply our solution concept derived in section 3.8 for 
solving some numerical examples when h, / , Cs and S takes some particular values. 
We will first find the equilibrium solution in each case. When we try to deviate the 
seller agent (or buyer agent) equilibrium strategy while the opponent does not shift 
from the equilibrium strategy, we can show that the payoff for the player will 
decrease. Therefore, if both agents are rational, they will adhere to the strategies 
specified by the equilibrium solution. Now, we will show the first numerical example. 
3.9.1 Example 1: Type A Combination. 
In this case, we set = 0.99, cs = 400, h = 1,000, / = 500. When the parameters of the 
/? + Cs 
negotiation game take those values, we should know that/ < ~ - ~ . Clearly the Type 
A and Type C restricted equilibrium solution should be given by (1 000，700) and 
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(500,a2) where aiis arbitrary. The expected payoff of Type A restricted equilibrium 
solution is 178.2 while the expected payoff of Type C restricted equilibrium solution 
is 100. 
Now, we will consider the Type B restricted equilibrium solution. With those 
parametric values given above, we should realize thaXh + 3cs > 41. When we substitute 
the constant value into the expression / + (1 - - Cs) and si, we learn that their value 
are 501 and 520.8580 respectively. The root of the cubic equation 
3 (5 l -Cl ) 2 {Bi-Ci) (B3-C3) _ 
16S 16S 16S 
should be given by 585.0822, 565.4390 and 400.9798. As they are all out of the range 
of [501 530.858) and the payoff when ai tends to si should be greater than the payoff 
whenai = / + ( ! - d){l - Cs), the Type B restricted equilibrium should be dominated by 
the Type A restricted equilibrium solution. 
Therefore, the seller agent should use a Type A strategic combination (1000, 
700). 
Suppose now, the seller agent (seller) deviates from its optimal strategy and 
use a strategic combination (585.0822, 573.3004). When the buyer agent (buyer) 
receives the first offer 585.0822, he learns that the seller agent has deviated from his 
equilibrium solution. As the first offer is within the range i.e. 520.8580 and h i.e. 
1000, the buyer agent should regard that the seller agent is using a Type A 
combination. Therefore, the buyer agent will reject the first round offer and therefore 
the payoff fiinction of the seller agent should be given by the second round expected 
payoff with a value 146.4115. Clearl, if the seller agent deviate from using the 
equilibrium strategy and use the strategic combination (585.0822, 573.3004), his 
expected payoff will decrease. 
On the other hand, suppose the seller agent deviates form his optimal strategy 
by using a Type B combination (515, 510.9745). After the buyer agent receives the 
first offer 515, he knows that the seller agent has deviate from his optimal strategy. 
By the assumption of sequential optimality, the buyer agent should regard that the 
seller agent is still rational and want to maximize his second payoff by using a second 
offer such that 
a i - (1 _ S ) l - V ( 1 - - / ) ( “ i - Q - a + Scs) 
ai =510.9745 
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the expected payoff will be given by 108.3415. Clearly, if the seller agent deviate 
from using the equilibrium strategy and use the Type B Combination (515, 510.9745), 
his expected payoff will decrease. 
3.9.2 Example 2: Type B Combination 
In this case, we set(^ = 0.7，cs : 4 0 0 , = 700, / = 500. When the parameters of the 
/? + Cs 
game take those values, we should know that I < . Clearly the Type A and Type 
C restricted equilibrium solution should be given by (700, 550) and (500, ai) where 
a i h arbitrary. The expected payoff of Type A restricted equilibrium solution is 78.75 
while the expected payoff of Type C restricted equilibrium solution is 100. 
Now, we will consider the Type B restricted equilibrium solution. With those 
parametric values given above, we should realize that /? + < 4 / . Therefore, one 
possible Type B restricted equilibrium solution should be (515, 500) and the 
corresponding expected payoff is 103.75. When we substitute the constant value into 
the expression / + (1 - (5)(/- c^) and 52, we learn that their value are 530 and 580 
respectively. The root of the cubic equation 
165 165 \6d 
should be given by 516.5170, 500 and 428.4830 respectively. As the roofs are out of 
the range [530, 580), the Type B restricted equilibrium solution should be given by 
(515, 500). 
Therefore, the seller agent's equilibrium strategy should be given'by the Type 
B Combination (515, 500). 
Now, suppose that the seller agent deviate his optimal strategy by using a 
Type B combination (610, 600). When the buyer agent receive the first offer 610 
which is greater than the value of si i.e. 580, he will regard the seller agent as using a 
Type A combination and reject the first offer. As a result, the expected payoff of the 
seller agent will then be given by 70 which is lower than the payoff i.e. 103.75. 
On the other hand, suppose the seller agent uses a Type B combination (570, 
522.5403). When the buyer agent receives this first offer 570, he will regard the seller 
agent as using a Type B combination with the second offer given by the value 
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522.5403. Then the payoff of the seller agent strategy should be given by 84.2217 
which is less favorable. 
3.9.3 Example 3; Type C Combination 
In this case, we set (^=0.85, C5 = 2 0 0 , = 700, / = 500. When the parameters of the 
/? + Cs 
game value take those values, we should know that / > ^ . Clearly the Type A and 
Type C restricted equilibrium solution should be given by (700, 500) and (500, a i ) 
where ai is arbitrary. Type B restricted equilibrium solution is always dominated. The 
expected payoff of Type A restricted equilibrium solution is 255 while the expected 
payoff of Type C restricted equilibrium solution is 300. 
Therefore, the seller agent's equilibrium strategy should be given by a Type C 
restricted equilibrium solution. (500, ai). 
Now, suppose that the seller deviate his equilibrium strategy by using a Type 
B combination (510，505). The expected payoff of the seller will be 293.1972 which 




Conclusions and Future Works 
In this chapter, we will first summarize the result of previous chapter. Then, we will 
mention the possible development on adopting the theory of Dynamic Game with 
incomplete information to find the Sequential Equilibrium and formulate the 
equilibrium strategy of seller or buyer agent in more complicated negotiation model. 
4.1 Summary of Strategies 
In the previous chapter, we have derived consistent belief and optimal strategies for 
both the seller agent (seller) and buyer agent (buyer) in a two stages One-to-One 
negotiation when the seller's private valuation is known as Cs and the buyer's 
valuation is uniformly distributed over(/, h). 
We will first summarize the (property of the) equilibrium strategy for the 
buyer agent. In our game setting, the buyer agent always situates in singleton 
information set, we need not discuss his belief on the private valuation of the seller 
agent. When the seller agent is using any Strategic Combination ai) (which should 
undoubtedly include the seller agent's Equilibrium Strategic Combination), the buyer 
agent should use the first offer a\ as well as the second offer a2 of the seller agent and 
the discount factor 5 to determine the value of c * by the expression — . The 
\-o 
buyer agent can then determine the first round threshold valuation c\ which should be 
equal to the maximum of the value of c * or ai. If the buyer private valuation on the 
product Cfiis greater than or equal to this threshold valuation c\, he will accept the 
first offer a\ and ignore any potential second offer. On the other hand, if the buyer 
valuation on the product CB is less than the threshold valuations, the buyer agent 
will reject the first offer a\ and wait for the second offer . 
After the first round of the negotiation, the buyer agent will wait for the 
second offer. Suppose the second offer is less than or equal to the buyer's private 
valuation CB, he will accept the offer. Otherwise, he will reject the second offer. Most 
importantly, because we assume that both the buyer agent and the seller agent are 
rational and can evaluate the Sequential Equilibrium of thfe Bargaining game, the 
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buyer agent should know the equilibrium strategic combinations (ai, ai) and calculate 
the threshold valuations . Hence, if the players follow their equilibrium strategies, the 
buyer agent knows the outcome of the game at the start of the negotiation game. 
After we have concluded the equilibrium buyer's strategies, we will mention 
seller agent's equilibrium strategies and belief on buyer's valuation. The seller agent, 
who is assumed to be rational and depends on the expected payoff perceived at the 
start of the negotiation, uses a Type A restricted. Type B restricted or Type C 
restricted equilibrium solution. When the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent is 
/? + Cs 
using the Type A restricted equilibrium solution, i.e. when I < ~ ^ and the strategic 
( h + Cs\ . 
combination as h, , the seller agent's belief on the buyer's private valuation at 
V 2 y .. 
second round of the negotiation should be given by P(CB) , I <CB<H, which is the 
original p.d.f. on buyer's private valuation. 
On the other hand, when the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent is using 
the Type C restricted equilibrium solution, i.e. the strategic combination (/, 02)where 
I <a2<h, we need not formulate the buyer's belief in the second round as the second 
stage of the game tree is out of the equilibrium path. 
Finally, when the equilibrium strategy of the seller agent is using the Type B 
/? + Cs 
restricted equilibrium solutions, ie. when I < , those candidate solutions may be 
summarized as follow 
Range of a\ Type B restricted equilibrium solution 
/ < a i< / + (1 - S){1 -Cs) h + 3cs > 4/ no solution 
h + 3cs<4l f{\-S){h + Cs) I 况广 
I • 2 + ' J 
/ + (1 — S){1 - Cs) <a\<Ss i. the first offer a\ prescribed by the Type B 
restricted equilibrium solution (if any) are real 
roots of the equations 
？ + ( 及 丨 （ 伦 + (伤-C3) = 0 (if 
16S \6S \6S 
possible) and the corresponding value of ai should 
be given by 
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ai-{\-5)1 - J{\ - S)(ai - /)[ai _ (/ 一汉 + Scs)]  
^ 
ii. When the payoff is maximized when 
a\=l + (\-S){l-Cx) ’ it is the solution when 
h + 3cs> 4/ and the corresponding value of 
ai should be given by 
ai — (1 - S ) l - J{\ -S){ax - l ) [ a i - ( 1 - S I + Scs)]  
^  
However, when h + 3cs<4l, no solution in this 
case. 
When the payoff is most favorable when a\ tend to si, 
no solution. 
S2<a\<h no solution 
21 - 5{l - Cs) + " c f (/ - Csf + 4(1 - d){h - If 
Note: Si = 
2 
Bi = -%{5h + 6l-5dUAdcs) 
伦 = + 4/ - 3(57 + 2dcs){5h + 12/-11(57 + \OScs) 
B2 = -(/-Sl + dcs){dh + 4/ — 3 J/ + Idcsf . 
Cx = -2A{\-5)i2l-a + Scs) 
Ci = 3(1 - S)(4l - 3Sl + 3&.)(4/-51 + 5cs) 
Cs : -(1 - - 3汉 + ?>Scsf 
/? -f" Cs 
Table 4.1 Candidate Type B restricted equilibrium when / < 
！Z 
When the aforementioned Type B restricted equilibrium solution is used by 
the seller agent, the seller agent's belief in an information set that is on the 
equilibrium path will be given by 
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and JU{CB | ai) = 0 for all other values of CB . 
4.2Future Work 
The solution as shown above is complete for our two Stage One-to-One 
Negotiation Problems with a uniform distribution on buyer's valuation. One possible 
way forward is to use other distribution P(CB) e.g. normal distribution, for buyer's 
private valuation and solve the relevant solution. If other types of probabilities on 
buyer's valuation is used and the seller's private valuation is not a known value, we 
should have a better understanding on the general situation of two stage One-to-One 
negotiation. However, some types of probability distribution may have a complicated 
functional form and the computation will become more difficult. We may need to rely 
on computer to assist the calculation. 
Another interesting direction of research is to generalize the two rounds 
negotiation to an N rounds negotiation. However, this may not be an easy task. For 
each stage of the bargaining, there is a proliferation of decision nodes, Information Set, 
and belief. If the game tree becomes too broad and too extensive, it is very hard to 
evaluate the Sequential Equilibrium of the game. However, if powerful mathematical 
tools can be used to solve these problems, the solution so obtained will be very 
general and should have a wide scope of application. 
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